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ABSTRACT 
 
Throughout the eighteenth century, Jamaican maroons, or original bands of 
runaway slaves, utilized frontier zones to maintain independence.  Frontier zones were 
desolate, unoccupied areas that no group fully controlled because of the harsh 
environments.  Jamaican maroon groups lived autonomously from the late seventeenth 
century until the end of the eighteenth century, due to the inaccessibility of their villages 
and an expertise in unconventional warfare.  In 1739, treaties ended years of fighting with 
the British colonists.  The treaties damaged the frontier areas through the presence of 
British officers, the maintenance of clear roads, and a requirement that granted the 
maroons freedom for their collaboration.  Despite the treaties, frontier zones remained 
until the Trelawny maroon rebellion in 1795.  This event marked an ending point in one 
Jamaican frontier.  Furthered colonization, along with added fears of widespread 
rebellion, compromised the frontier areas surrounding the Trelawny community.  Only in 
frontier zones could maroons exist autonomously and apart from the rest of the colony.  
As demonstrated by the Trelawny event, without surrounding frontier zones the maroons 
held no place in social structure of colonial Jamaica.   
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PROLOGUE 
 
In this work, I argue that Jamaican maroon transformations from rebels to 
collaborators centered largely on the expansion and destruction of the surrounding 
frontier zones they inhabited.  I will demonstrate growth and reduction of the frontier tied 
directly to events in the wider Atlantic World.  Historian Bernard Bailyn used the term 
Atlantic World to describe the connections between Africa, Western Europe, and the 
Americas, which lasted from the sixteenth into the nineteenth centuries.  The exchanges 
between Atlantic World people opened up new ideas, opportunities, and alliances with 
groups that had historically been separated geographically.  In this fluid environment, 
transformations forced maroons, and other groups, to re-invent and adapt often.  This 
work will demonstrate patterns of settlement, trade, and production in the British West 
Indies mainly influenced the development and eventual destruction of the Jamaican 
maroons and their frontier zones. 
Chapter one, Defining the Jamaican Maroons, will discuss the difficulties of 
creating an accurate history for a group that produced no written records.  Only a limited 
number of colonists entered maroon territory, so there were few firsthand accounts of 
interaction with the groups.  Historians, therefore, must rely on primary sources that 
foster incomplete accounts of the maroon experience.  This lack of source material 
hampered most attempts at a complete written history of the maroons.  Not until the late 
twentieth century did accurate and unbiased accounts of the maroons appear.  Present day 
scholars continue to grapple with this lack of primary source material from the maroon 
communities. 
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Chapter two, Establishing Autonomy in the Frontier Zones, will discuss the 
early maroons (1700-1740), or the first time maroons, as they are known to twentieth 
century Jamaicans.  In desolate frontier zones, early maroons secured their autonomy 
through violence.  The frontier zones were vital to maroon success in the formation of 
their settlements.  During this critical period, maroons fought off attempts at intervention 
into their controlled space.  Plunder and war provided the early maroons with a steady 
supply of men, weapons, and reinforced distinction between themselves and other blacks 
in Jamaica. 
Chapter three, Exposing the Frontier Zones, will discuss the depletion of the 
frontier zones after the maroons signed treaties with the colonial government.  An added 
British presence exposed frontier zones in a number of ways.  British officers lived 
among the maroon communities to ensure compliance with the agreements.  The maroons 
maintained clear roads and patrolled frontier zones in search of runaways.  These 
changes, while they did not close the frontier, made certain areas safer and more 
susceptible to colonization.  Despite this compromise, maroons survived by policing the 
remaining frontier zones for an allotted fee.  Maroons accepted their role as collaborators 
and this reflected in their willingness to adopt some English customs.  Collaboration 
allowed their communities to remain distinct, and provided the necessary subsistence to 
remain semi-autonomous in the desolate locations. 
Chapter four, The Destruction of the Trelawny Frontier, will demonstrate the 
closing of certain frontier zones by the late eighteenth century.  The rebellion of the 
Trelawny maroons in 1795 was caused mainly from growth into the frontier of western 
Jamaica.  While most scholars determined local events played the largest role in the 
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rebellion, it is clear the gradual destruction of this western frontier played a large part as 
well.  Through continued colonization, expansion, and the threat of rebellion, barren 
frontier areas diminished.  The complaints of the Trelawny maroons and their decision to 
rebel stemmed from a loss of ample land, space, and autonomy.  Most importantly to 
historians, however, the Trelawny group demonstrated the necessity of frontier zones for 
organized groups of blacks living in the colonial Americas.  
Understanding the changing positions of the Jamaican maroons as related to the 
frontier zones better clarifies their roles.  The traditional definition of frontier is mainly 
associated with Frederick Jackson Turners notion that the frontier borders were meeting 
points between civilization and barbarity.1  Since the early nineteenth century, historians 
have developed the concept of the frontier further, especially in regards to the colonial 
Americas.  All scholars would tend to agree with Evan Haefelis broad definition that 
frontiers were simply, a meeting place of people in which geographic and cultural 
borders were not clearly defined.2   
 The difficulty historians have with describing these areas speaks to their 
complexity.  Borderlands, contact zones, zones of interaction, and middle ground are all 
terms used to define these areas.  Regardless of the term used, frontier areas throughout 
the world, although all unique, have some similar characteristics.  One, the location of 
these areas is always difficult to proximate.  Two, while conquest remains a dominant 
theme, there are often long periods of accommodation.  Third, the period of time in which 
                                                
1 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1921). 
 
2 Evan Haefeli, A Note on the Use of North American Borderlands, American Historical Review 
104 (October 1999): 1222-1225. 
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these areas remain a frontier is vague and difficult to define.  Not every frontier 
demonstrates all of these criteria, but most areas share some of the characteristics.3   
The Jamaican frontier zones of the eighteenth century fit all three of the 
characteristics.  Maroons of Jamaica gathered in desolate mountain regions, sinkholes, 
forests, and caves.  European colonizers had yet to explore these regions.  Few knew of 
the maroons precise locations, especially during the early period from 1700-1740.  
Conquest also remained a dominant theme throughout the eighteenth century Jamaican 
frontiers.  British colonists pushed further into the interior portions of the island as 
colonization expanded.  This was mainly to increase the number of plantations, as 
Jamaica went from a colony of small landowners to large-scale plantations.  During this 
period, there were also occasional periods of accommodation as seen with the treaties 
signed in 1740.  The Jamaican frontier areas also are difficult to place in a chronological 
sense.  Certain areas, such as Trelawny, experienced rampant expansion and exposure to 
the rest of the colony much earlier than other areas, such as the Charlestown maroons in 
the Blue Mountains.  By the nineteenth century though, frontier zones of Jamaica, in the 
traditional sense, diminished as all regions of the island became further cultivated and 
explored.
                                                
3 Characteristics developed from discussion of Jeremy Aldenman and Stephen Aaron, From 
Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States and the People in Between North American History, 
American Historical Review 104 (June 1999): 814-841. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Throughout the Americas, groups of runaway slaves and natives formed 
communities in remote areas.  From the early sixteenth century well into the mid-
nineteenth century, maroonage, or flight from slavery was the most significant form of 
resistance against the colonial system that enslaved millions of Africans and native 
peoples.  These groups, first called cimarrones by the Spanish, created some of the most 
direct threats to European control and exploitation in the New World.  Organized groups 
of runaways formed in Cuba, Jamaica, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, as well as 
portions of North America.  In these areas large-scale plantations often held hundreds, if 
not thousands, of African slaves.  The plantations provided the necessary goods and 
people needed for some maroon communities to exist. 
Although the nature of maroon groups throughout the Atlantic World varied 
according to their locations, certain characteristics were true of most organized runaway 
groups.  All known maroon groups lived in isolated areas.  Most, but not all, runaway 
groups utilized unconventional warfare to maintain a degree of independence in these 
secluded areas.  Lastly, successful warfare, for some maroons, was due to the information 
received from the slave communities.   
Through these advantages, the colonial government granted some runaway groups 
treaties that formerly recognized their sovereignty.  Treaties developed in Brazil, Mexico, 
Cuba, Colombia, Dominica, Suriname, and Jamaica.  Initially, the treaties often benefited 
both the maroons and the colonial authorities.  For policing their areas and preventing 
runaways from congregating, and for ending violence against colonists, maroons often 
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received stipends or gifts.  Clearly most groups signed treaties as a form of self-
preservation.  Historian Michael Craton determined, By hunting runaways rather than 
acting as a focus for slave resistance maroons preserved their communities from full 
dilution and reduced the threat of competition in the backlands.4  
Prior to treaties, for maroons in Jamaica, as with most organized groups, 
successful flight was dependent upon seclusion and defense.  The will of the individual 
slave and the protection offered by the surrounding environment kept some runaways 
from capture.  During the seventeenth century, maroon groups formed in St. Kitts, 
Barbados, and Antigua.  In the Bahamas, a group of black Seminoles reached Andros 
Island from the coast of Florida.  For several decades, the group maintained self-
sufficiency and semi-autonomy through the protections offered by isolation.5  
Throughout the Atlantic World, many groups lived in seclusion like the black Seminoles.  
They were found in the mountainous interiors of St. Domingue, Jamaica and Central 
America, the thick swamps of southern Florida, the Brazilian Amazon and the dense 
jungles of Guyana.  
In some cases, maroon communities had thousands of residents and maintained a 
lengthy distance between themselves and the colony.  The eighteenth century maroons of 
St. Domingue known as le Maniel were twelve hours away from the nearest Frenchmen, 
without any access by road.6  In Pernambuco, Brazil one quilombo or maroon group 
                                                
4 Michael Craton, Testing the Chain: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1982), 64-65. 
 
5 Rosalyn Howard, Black Seminoles in the Bahamas (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 
2002), 9-15. 
 
6 Gabriel Debien, Le Maroonage aux Antilles Francaises au XVIIIIe siecle, Caribbean Studies 6 
(1966): 3-44. 
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known as Palmares grew large enough in the seventeenth century for one scholar to 
declare it an African state in Brazil.7  Palmares, which consisted of 30,000 residents at 
its height, threatened Portuguese mining interests in the Minas Gerias area, posing a 
grave threat to the colonial enterprise.  It took nearly a century of fighting and a force of 
six thousand men to subdue Palmares.  
Organization and persistent autonomy were key distinctions between large-scale 
communities like Palmares and what historian Richard Price termed, petit marronage, or 
individual flight.  Many times this resistance went undetected by the plantation overseers, 
but disrupted work and profitability.  This was a common occurrence as slaves often 
returned after briefly fleeing to join neighboring plantations and runaway communities to 
see loved ones or participated in festivities.  Other runways returned after they found 
conditions in frontier zones too difficult.8 Planters realized flight and maroon groups 
were a danger to plantations and profitability.  The communities offered a clear 
alternative to the harsh life of enslavement.  Jamaican planter and author R.C. Dallas best 
described the threat the maroons posed to all slaveholders in the Americas, noting, They 
remained a rallying point for all who were disposed to quit a state of labor.9  
 Fugitive slaves caught fleeing the plantations were often brutally punished.  
Records indicated the severe punishments reserved for runaways.  The brutal treatment of 
                                                
7 For more information on Palmares see, R.K. Kent Palmares: An African State in Brazil, 
Journal of African History 6 (1965): 161-175. 
 
8 Richard Price, ed., Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in America, 2d Ed. (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1992), 8-9. 
 
9 R.C. Dallas, The History of the Maroons, From Their Origins to Their Establishment of Their 
Chief Tribe in Sierre Leone: Including An Expedition to Cuba, For The Purpose of Procuring Spanish 
Chasseurs; and the State of the Island of Jamaica for the Last Ten Years: With a Succinct History of the 
Island Previous to that Period vol. 1 (London: T.N. Longman and O. Rees, 1805; Reprint, London: Cass 
Libraries, 1968), 27. 
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runaways demonstrated the enormous threat maroonage posed.  Often to deter other 
slaves, planters performed punishments for flight in a public setting.  In seventeenth 
century Cartagena, one runaway slave was tied up at the city pillorywith strings of 
bells around his body, whipped 100 times, and left in that position all day long for other 
slaves to see. 10  In Dutch Suriname, punishments for runaways included a slow roasting 
execution, castration, and the amputation of various limbs.11  Many slaves recaptured in 
the United States wore iron shackles, masks, muzzles and other types of headgear.12  This 
practice went on until the middle portions of the eighteenth century.  At that time, laws 
were fully enforced regarding the treatment and execution of slaves.  
Successful maroonage, especially in smaller colonies, depended upon slave 
communities for support.  Assistance included information regarding the colonists, guns 
and ammunition, a steady supply of men and more importantly women, and in some 
cases necessary goods such as food, water, and shelter.  Maroon communities, initially, 
were comprised mostly of men.  Maroons often raided plantations with the sole purpose 
of obtaining women.  In most cases, slave communities also were a constant source of 
companionship, as the two communities bonded together through their African cultures 
and subservient status in the colony.   
Besides aid from slave communities, maroon groups sustained goods through 
plunder and protected their inhabited land through unconventional warfare or what some 
                                                
10 Aquiles Escalante, Notas sobre el Palenque de San Basilio, una communidad negra de 
Colombia, Divulgaciones Ethologicals 3, (1954): 207. 
 
11 Richard and Sally Price, Stedmans Suriname: Life in Eighteenth Century Slave Society 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992), 39. 
 
12 Herbert Apthecker, Maroons Within the Present Limits of the United States, The Journal of 
Negro History 24 (April 1939): 167. 
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have termed guerrilla warfare.13  Throughout the Americas, the presence of maroons 
posed a threat of attack and possible rebellion.  Maroons located near colonists, such as 
those in Jamaica, North America, and portions of Central America, intimidated 
neighboring plantations to secure goods, provisions, and slaves.  In 1630, Dominican friar 
and missionary Thomas Gage observed a group of runaways in the Chol Maya territory 
of Spanish controlled Vera Paz (present day Guatemala).  He noted the runaways 
sustained themselves through the plunder of wine, iron, clothing and weapons from 
travelers moving through their region.14   
The North American South experienced instances of plunder and pillage as well.  
In 1711, one planter in Charleston, South Carolina noted many in the city were in great 
fear and terror as many runaways armed themselves, robbing, and plundering houses 
and plantations.15  In 1795, Wilmington, North Carolina residents were overcome by a 
number of runaway Negroes, who in the daytime secrete themselves in the swamps and 
woods, but at night committed depredations on the neighboring plantations.16   
Plunder often allowed maroons to secure weapons and provisions that aided them 
in battle.  One planter in Virginia noted the runaways first objective is to obtain a gun 
and ammunitionas to defend themselves from attack, or accomplish objects of 
                                                
13 Napoleon developed the term guerilla warfare to describe methods of Spanish resistance in 
the nineteenth century.  The etymology derives from the Spanish word meaning little war.  See, Anthony 
James Joes, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biological, and Biographical Sourcebook (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1996), 15-16. 
 
14 Thomas Gage, The English-American, A New Survey of the West Indies (London: R. Cotes, 
1648; Reprint, London: Routledge, 1928), 113. 
 
15 Apthecker, Maroons, 169-171. 
 
16 James Carey, Wilmington Chronicle, 10 July 1795. 
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terror.17  When these goods could not be obtained, innovative techniques overcame the 
lack of supplies in the desolate regions.  Contemporary accounts indicated Jamaican 
maroons rolled large boulders down the paths used by approaching parties.18  In 
Suriname, contemporary sources indicated maroons used buttons, coins, and pebbles as 
shot when bullets were scarce.19  With these seemingly primitive weapons and minimal 
supplies, some maroons were able to defeat European soldiers sent to subdue them.    
John Gabriel Stedmen, a member of the Scots Brigade, spent five years hunting 
maroon communities in Suriname near the end of the eighteenth century.  During his time 
there, he compiled daily diaries where he told of the tactics used by the maroons.  In May 
of 1774, Stedmen described how neighboring groups of soldiers sent to destroy a maroon 
settlement were ambushed before they even reached their destination.  The surprise attack 
left the left the group decimated as, the rebels, being appraised of his intention by their 
spies (which they never lack), immediately marched out against him, laying themselves 
in an ambush near the borders of a deep marsh through which Lieutenant Lepper with his 
party were to pass on their way to the Rebel settlement.  No sooner were these 
unfortunate men got in the swamp till near their armpits than their black enemies rushed 
out from under cover and shot them dead in the water at pleasure.20 
Like the maroons of Suriname, Jamaican maroons formed in remote locations that 
aided their defense.  From the end of Spanish occupation in 1655, the interior regions of 
Jamaica with large limestone deposits and towering mountain ranges provided a safe 
                                                
17 Apthecker, Maroons, 173. 
 
18 Dallas, History, 49. 
 
19 Price, Stedmans, 47. 
 
20 Price, Stedmans, 41.  
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refuge.  A Spanish slave named Juan de Bolas led the first maroons in Jamaica.  They 
fled to the interior western portion of the Jamaican hinterlands several years before the 
English takeover of the island in 1655.  Juan Lubolo, later known as Juan de Bolas to the 
English, led a group of rebel slaves into the mountains outside the parish of Clarendon.  
From here, Juan de Bolas and his men defeated Spanish and English attempts at capture.  
Later as his power grew, Juan de Bolas assisted the Spanish under the leadership of Don 
Christoval Arnaldo de Yassi who by the late seventeenth century had taken over the 
Spanish resistance movement against the English.  The two men joined forces and used 
guerrilla tactics to oppose the English attempts to capture the runaways. 
Unable to resolve internal disputes between the Spanish, Juan de Bolas later 
supported the English after they granted him land in return for his services.  Juan de 
Bolas betrayed his own men living in the frontier in return for more land and wealth from 
the English.  He was supposedly killed in an ambush while on an expedition to destroy a 
runaway settlement that he helped to create.  Juan de Bolas presages the temptation other 
maroon leaders had when forced to become both conquers and conquered.21 
The group led by Juan de Bolas into the mountains formed what became known 
as the Windward maroons, the first of two permanent maroon settlements in Jamaica.  
After the English won control of Jamaica, the remaining runaways retreated east into 
Jamaicas tallest mountains.  Throughout the later half of the seventeenth century, the 
Windward communities grew in scale and maintained staunch independence.  Little 
information exists regarding the Windward maroons, especially during the seventeenth 
                                                
21 Mavis Campbell, Maroonage in Jamaica: Its Origins in the Seventeenth Century, In Rubin and 
Tuden, eds., vol. 292 of Comparative Perspectives On Slavery In the New World (New York Academy of 
Sciences, 1977), 390-393. 
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century.  It remains unclear to scholars how large or unified this community became 
during the seventeenth century.  Windward maroons, however, were clearly the first 
runaways to be termed maroons, and this indicated their longevity and likely continued 
existence since Spanish occupation. 
It was not until after 1690 that groups, known as the Leeward maroons, 
consolidated in the northwestern Jamaica.  The Leeward maroons, unlike the Windward 
group, did not become a formidable threat to the colony until around 1720.  The Leeward 
community emerged from a series of slave rebellions in the central portions of the island.  
In 1663, the first of many rebellions occurred that led to their formation.  In this year, 
about 200 slaves involved in an uprising killed a number of whites on several plantations.  
After this, the group retreated to the mountains and secured themselves in difficult 
places between the parishes of Clarendon, St. Elizabeth, and St. Anne from whence they 
never were dislodged.22   
Although on a smaller scale than the 1663 uprising, other rebellions occurred in 
1670, 1673, and 1678.  In 1690, another large-scale uprising led by more than 500 slaves 
helped formed the rest of the group, as around 200 of these slaves escaped into the 
wilderness.  Planter R.C. Dallas noted the importance of this event.  The Leeward band 
formed mainly from, an insurrection of slaves in the parish of Claredon in the year of 
1690. 23  The group was joined throughout these years by a steady flow of runaways 
from the plantations.  By 1720, the groups were united under a colonel, as they were 
known to maroons, named Cudjoe.  From the time of Cudjoes control, the Leeward 
                                                
22 Long, History of Jamaica, 305. 
 
23 Dallas, History, 46. 
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maroons posed a constant threat to the plantations neighboring the foothills in the 
northern parts of Clarendon and southern areas of St. Anne parish. 
Until the eighteenth century, runaways congregated near plantations and kept 
steady contact with slaves in the plantations.  Soon after Cudjoes ascent, the Leeward 
maroons retreated to secluded lands with better protections.  This area, known as the 
cockpit country, was a series of cave-like formations carved out of limestone deposits.  
The region was located near the parishes of St. James, Westmoreland, St. Elizabeth, and 
what would become Trelawny.  After re-locating to the cockpit region, the runaways 
consolidated their powers.  Historian Carey Robinson explains, In a short time all men 
ceased to call them (Leeward maroons) runaways and they too became known as 
maroons like the earlier runaways in the north and east.24    
By the early part of the eighteenth century, both maroon groups posed serious 
threats to economic stability of the entire island.  During this period, maroon populations 
thrived as growing numbers of slaves were brought to the island.  In 1713, the Treaty of 
Utrecht granted British merchants the right to supply Spanish America with African 
slaves.  After this point, Jamaica remained a staging ground for newly imported Africans.  
This constantly brought large numbers of slaves to the island, which continually supplied 
the maroons with new members.  In 1658, there were 1,400 mostly enslaved blacks living 
on the island.  By 1700, about 45,000 slaves lived on the island.  By 1740, the number 
climbed to about 60,000 slaves.25  Increasingly unified and numerous, maroon 
communities grew in power from 1700-1730.  This trend of growth continued throughout 
                                                
24 Carey Robinson, The Fighting Maroons (Kingston: William Collins and Sangster, 1974), 33. 
 
25 Campbell, Maroonage, 390-91. 
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the eighteenth century.  During this 100 year period from 1700-1800, maroon 
insurrections peaked among groups in Brazil, Jamaica, Suriname and Guiana.26 
Treaties in 1739 and 1740 ended violence between the colonists and the maroons.  
From 1740 until the end of the eighteenth century, both Leeward and Windward maroons 
willingly hunted down runaway slaves and suppressed slave uprisings.  This 
transformation brought semi-autonomy, but ended previous informal alliances with the 
slave communities.  Initially, the treaties proved beneficial to both the British and the 
maroons.  The British had eradicated any safe haven for runaways and the maroons were 
granted land and fees for services as military auxiliaries.  
This period of collaboration between maroons and the colonial governance lasted 
until the end of the century.  By 1775, many maroon groups openly voiced their 
complaints about a lack of space to the colonial authorities.  Expansion of sugar 
plantations restricted the dwindling amount of maroon land as the eighteenth century 
progressed.  The increased number of slaves created difficulties in upholding the treaties 
as more slaves brought frequent disturbances to the island.  This great change was a 
direct influence of the increased value of sugar throughout the Atlantic World.  Sugar 
became a product no longer of luxury but that of necessity for a majority of eighteenth 
and nineteenth century western Europeans.  Jamaican planters sought to maximize their 
profits and began to pursue all available land for production.27 
The Trelawny rebellion in 1795 was the culmination of this anger that slowly 
developed throughout the eighteenth century.  Near the end of the eighteenth century, 
                                                
26 Philip Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 12. 
 
27 Sidney Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1986), 160-161. 
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unity among Jamaican maroon groups eroded.  Maroons formerly known as the Leeward 
and Windward groups formed smaller, localized bands with their own distinct needs.  
Some maroons continued to abide by the treaties, while others were a nuisance to the 
colonial authorities and refused to collaborate.  Former descendents of the Leeward band, 
the Trelawny maroons turned to armed rebellion after a number of local incidents took 
place.  British forces that numbered about 1500 and the Trelawny maroons former ally, 
the neighboring maroons from Accompong, attempted to subdue the group of about 
300.28   
Without the aid of the neighboring groups, the last remaining maroon holdouts 
were forced to surrender after about nine months of fighting.  Governor Alexander 
Balcarres gave the maroons little if any time to surrender near the end of the war.  In 
January of 1796, he issued a proclamation that ordered them to surrender in a limited 
amount of time.  Several days after the terms of Balcarres statements, many maroons 
from Trelawny surrendered to the British authorities.  It was not until March that all 
members of the rebellion had surrendered.  One soldier explained, After seven months 
of fighting, the Maroons capitulated to General Walpole, the commander of the troops, 
and laid down their arms, on the condition that their lives should be spared, and they 
should be suffered to remain in the colony, under the whites as before. 29  Despite 
reassurance they would not be deported, the Trelawny maroons immediately were placed 
upon ships awaiting departure in Montego Bay. 
                                                
28 Dallas, History, 152-53. 
 
29 John Stewart, An Account of Jamaica and Its Inhabitants (London: Hurst, Rees and Orme, 1808; 
Reprint, Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 284. 
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After subjugation the Trelawny maroons went to Nova Scotia where they stayed 
for several years until, upon their many requests, they were sent to Sierra Leone.  Other 
maroon groups remaining in Jamaica continued to fight for autonomy and land 
throughout the nineteenth century.  Slowly the rights and property they fought many 
decades to protect vanished.  In 1842, the Jamaican government passed the Land 
Allotment Act officially voiding the treaty agreements signed nearly a century ago.30  
Nineteenth and twentieth century maroons struggled from a lack of development and 
willingness to interact with other Jamaicans. 
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CHAPTER 1.  DEFINING THE JAMAICAN MAROONS 
 
Both primary and secondary literature on the Jamaican maroons remains 
hampered by a lack of sources from the communities.  Without evidence from maroons, 
historians struggle to balance the information recorded by planters, colonial officials, and 
colonists.  Early secondary sources of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries added little 
to scholarship on the subject.  They often reiterated the same views held by the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century British planters.  As an attempt to remedy this incomplete picture, 
many works of the mid-twentieth century romanticized the maroon communities.  
Folklore written by Jamaicans was largely responsible for the revisions.  They readily 
linked their struggle to gain independence in the twentieth century with the maroons 
fight of the eighteenth century.  Although this romantic theme continues in some 
scholarship, after 1970 historians and anthropologists constructed a more complete 
representation regarding maroonage and Jamaican maroons.    
Despite the lack of direct sources from the communities, their service to the 
colonial authorities and the level of cooperation with the British ruling class in Jamaica 
led to several descriptions of maroons by eighteenth century Jamaican residents.  Planter 
histories in the British colony provide ample material for a discussion of diplomacy 
between the groups and the threat posed by the runaway communities.  Primary 
documents regarding the maroons in Jamaica mainly derive from the writings of planter 
historians and naturalists who traveled or resided in remote areas near the maroons.  
Although their descriptions do not provide a complete rendering of the maroons, they do 
express aspects of eighteenth century life among the colonial elite in Jamaica and their 
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interactions with all residents of the island.  Planter historians such as Bryan Edwards, 
R.C. Dallas, and Edward Long all produced volumes of material on the maroons in 
eighteenth century Jamaica.  These authors were either in direct contact with maroons or 
spoke to British soldiers and militia members who entered their communities.   
Bryan Edwards, a West Indian merchant and contemporary historian, came to 
Jamaica in 1759 and stayed almost until his death in 1800.  He took over his uncles 
estate in 1773.  Along with this property, he became master to hundreds of slaves who 
inhabited the vast acres of his estate in Trelawny parish, Bryon Castle.31  Besides his role 
as a planter, Edwards was also an avid writer.  His contemporaries considered him a 
brilliant recorder of West Indian history and natural occurrences.  His work as a 
plantation owner and his travel throughout the Caribbean influenced Edwards writing.  
In his first major publication, The History of the British Colonies in the West Indies, 
Edwards argued a gradual reduction to end the system of slavery in order to avoid chaos 
and anarchy.  Edwards argued this same theme in numerous public appearances to thwart 
growing fears of an abolition movement in the late eighteenth century.32   
Edwards writing was also influenced by what he witnessed during the revolution 
in the neighboring island of St. Domingue.  In 1791, Edwards went to St. Dominuge at 
the instruction of Governor Thomas Effingham to gage the situation in the rebellious 
colony.  The scenes of the Haitian revolution horrified Edwards and two years later he 
released, A Historical Survey of the French Colony in the Island of Saint Domingue.  In 
this work Edwards connects the subjugation of the Jamaican maroons to the free blacks in 
                                                
31  For a depiction of Byron Castle see, B.W. Higman, Jamaica Surveyed: Plantation Maps and 
Plans of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (University of the West Indies Press, 1988), 234. 
 
32 Bryan Edwards.  The History, Civil and Commercial, of the British Colonies in the West  
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St. Domingue.  He argued for control over the maroons since much like the free blacks of 
St. Domingue, they too could encourage rebellion if they become dissatisfied.33  
Edwards financial interest in the continued success of his plantation influenced his 
descriptions of the Jamaican maroons as well.  Although his plantation was never under 
direct threat from maroons, many of his colleagues reiterated their concern to him about 
their presence.  Despite his personal bias, Edwards study has merit and certainly 
provided good insight into the mindset of the Jamaican planters during the eighteenth 
century.   
Much of information Edwards used regarding the history of the early maroon 
groups derived directly from planer historian Edward Long.  Edwards explains he 
adopted Longs work in some sections because I have nothing to add. 34   In 1774, 
Edward Long published The History of Jamaica, which included a section on the 
maroons as well.  Long, like Edwards, was born in England but considered himself first a 
West Indian.  At times, his work lacks sophistication mainly due to its broad focus.  Long 
explains his intention to cover not only political developments in Jamaica, but foreign 
relations, domestic topics, natural sciences, geography and social history as well.35   
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Long had few, if any, personal encounters with actual maroons.  Most all of his 
information came from secondhand accounts of soldiers, slaves, and colonists who met 
with maroons.  Although Longs work was some of the first produced regarding 
eighteenth century Jamaica, it lacks detailed descriptions of maroon communities and 
was incomplete in painting a vivid picture of the colony.  Most all of Long and Edwards 
discussions regarding the maroons dealt with battle, plunder, and destruction, and made 
little mention of life outside these areas.   
 R.C. Dallas, another contemporary planter historian, held a more favorable view 
of the maroons than his colleagues.  Dallas published, The History of the Maroons From 
Their Origin to the Establishment of Their Chief Tribe at Sierra Leone, in 1803.  He 
expressed concern that Edwards work painted an incomplete picture of maroon life.  At 
times, Dallas attempted to play the role of a neutral observer.  His study, considered the 
most complete of the contemporary planters, covers the history of the maroons from the 
time of Spanish withdrawal into the nineteenth century.  His work was without some of 
the bias of Edwards, Long and others who described only a warlike people.  In his 
introduction Dallas stated, it was his intention to construct a complete rendering of the 
maroons.  He explained, My talk, however, would have been very brief and in-complete, 
had I confined myself to the events of warI have therefore thought it proper to extend 
my plan including in it the whole history of the maroons.36   It is from his writing, 
ethnohistorians and anthropologists are able to glimpse a view of eighteenth century 
maroon life.   
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Besides Dallas, official documents, particularly the treaties, are useful to the 
historian as they emphasize the strain the maroon groups placed on the plantation owners.  
The treaties describe in vivid detail the aspects of maroon life that were daily threats to 
the plantations.  Edwards wrote the introduction to a collection of proceedings regarding 
the maroons he entitled, The Proceedings of the Governor and Assembly of Jamaica in 
Regard to the Maroon Negroes.  Assembly proceedings described numerous disputes 
among the maroons and colonists.  They also provided historians with good information 
on the changing relationships of maroons, slaves, colonists, and colonial officials.37  
The Trelawny rebellion also created valuable primary sources that have 
influenced scholars.  The memoirs of Alexander Lindsay Earl of Balcarres and governor 
of Jamaica during the time of the Trelawny rebellion indicated the tension between the 
colonists and the Trelawny group.  Although records from colonial governors and 
administrators exist, Balcarres memoirs were the only published.  In letters and speeches, 
Balcarres displayed a growing distrust of the maroons throughout his tenure.  He insisted 
that French immigrants from St. Domingue joined them to stir up rebellion.  Scholars 
have perhaps overlooked Balcarres and his peers.  It is his persistent fear of French 
emigrants that played a large role in the Trelawny deportation.38   
Contact from Balcarres with field commanders expressed concern about 
inevitable violence with the maroons and the need for deportation long before these ideas 
became official policy.  Balcarres wrote frequently to John Wentworth, the Duke of 
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Portland and governor of Nova Scotia between 1790 and 1796.  In correspondence, the 
two men often discussed the situation of the Trelawny maroon group.  The memoirs of 
Wentworth are also useful to historians as he described the daily occurrences of life for 
the maroons in Nova Scotia.  The maroons, who felt that Wentworth was kind to them in 
their plight, openly voiced their opinions about the violence.  To Wentworth, they 
recalled some aspects of their defiance that ultimately led to disunity, division, and war.39 
After the publication of Wentworths memoirs in 1830, very little work on the 
maroons appeared until the end of the nineteenth century.40  For decades, the writings of 
Dallas, Edwards, and Long were seen as complete depictions of the communities.  
Historians and anthropologists of the early twentieth century, much like Jamaican 
planters, often focused on the violent nature of the communities.  William Gardners 
History of Jamaica, published in 1873, largely reiterates Longs work in his sections 
dealing with the maroons.  Gardner vilified the maroons and portrayed them as savage 
and barbaric.41  Joseph Williams echoed this Euro-centric tone in the 1938 publication of 
The Maroons of Jamaica.  Williams also replicated much of the information discovered 
by Edwards, Dallas, and Long.  His study, however, remained rooted in early twentieth 
century anthropology.  Williams was the first to point to striking similarities between 
maroon and West African cultural practices.  For the most part though, Williams and 
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Gardners work repeated the same ideas of Dallas, Edwards, and Long.  With little to 
contribute to the field, they too included entire sections of writing from these men, and 
added little or no context to place them.42 
Secondary sources of the mid-twentieth century attempted to remedy this 
perceived bias through romanticized views of the maroon communities.  In these works, 
the maroons were portrayed as heroic freedom fighters that overcame the bonds of 
slavery through defiance.  This shift in the historiography occurred for two reasons.  One, 
there was an abundance of information in primary sources regarding maroon warfare and 
unconventional techniques.  Scholars of the mid-twentieth century simply spun tales that 
previous historians perceived as barbaric into acts of defiance.  Two, the climate of the 
colonial independence movement during the mid twentieth century largely shaped the 
views of some historians.  Post-colonial scholarship praised the maroons for their 
defiance and success in battle against the colonial system.  Few of the works mention or 
fully address the maroons role as collaborators with the colonial government.  Until the 
1970s, the maroon historiography remained incomplete.  Many scholars refused to 
acknowledge the complexities of the maroons position in the eighteenth century.  
 Although not without value, many accounts of the maroons as freedom fighters 
emerged during the mid-twentieth century at the time of Jamaican independence, in 1962, 
and many African nations independence around the same period.  Maroon defiance 
linked to the emergence of the Rastafarian movement as well.  Many saw their oppressed 
situation in Jamaica similar to that of the maroon communities.  Others found national 
heroes in the early maroon figures of Cudjoe, Nanny, and Accompong.  Many in Jamaica 
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viewed the eighteenth century maroon communities as mystical because it was perceived 
they defeated the strongest military power in the world with few resources.  Twentieth 
century maroons were responsible for many of the romanticized views of this historic 
group as well.43     
Maroon historians Carey Robinson illuminated this romantic theme of the 
maroons as heroic warriors.  Robinsons work is mainly a compilation of contemporary 
planter historian R.C. Dallass entries, but with added folklore that glorified and 
vindicated the violent acts of the maroons.  Besides information from Dallas, his 
evidence mainly derived from oral histories that developed around Accompong town, 
descendants of the Leeward maroons, and Moore Town, descendents of the Windward 
maroons.  Robinsons knowledge of interior Jamaica provided first hand descriptions of 
many areas inaccessible to scholars, but his agenda to create a heroic account of the 
maroons hampers most serious historical arguments presented.44  
This genre did produce some work of value to scholars.  C.L.G. Harris, a present-
day maroon colonel, compiled numerous accounts of maroon life from the time of 
inception to present-day.  In The Maroons of Moore Town, Harris provided a lengthy 
discussion of the linguistic patterns and their connections to ceremonies that invoke fallen 
ancestors.  Through this type of literature and a persistent oral history, Nanny, Cudjoe, 
and early maroons achieved legendary status in twentieth century Jamaica.45   
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Orlando Pattersons 1970 article, Slavery and Slave Revolts: A Sociohistorical 
Analysis of the First Maroon War, marked the beginning of unbiased historical studies 
regarding the Jamaican maroon communities.  He demonstrated the explicit connections 
between slaves and maroons, and the success achieved through rebellion during this early 
period.  Pattersons study explained the needed characteristics for runaways to achieve 
success.  Besides guerrilla warfare, runaways had to greatly outnumber the white planter 
class, maintain a low ratio of native-born slaves, sustain common ethnicity, and retreat to 
lands that provided favorable conditions for defense.  Patterson argued through his 
examination of the Jamaican maroon communities that, Large scale, monopolistic slave 
systems with a high rate of absenteeism will, geographical conditions permitting, exhibit 
a tendency toward slave revolts.46 
After Pattersons article, a number of scholarly works appeared.  In 1972, Richard 
Price complied, Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas.  This 
collection of essays, that included Pattersons article, demonstrated both the differences 
and similarities of organized runaway groups throughout the Americas.  Prices work 
emphasized the diverse nature of maroon communities.  He argued that all Afro-
American emigrants held onto African customs, but maroon life centered on these 
traditions.  Maroons in the Americas held a rare freedom to extrapolate African ideas 
and adapt them to changing circumstances. 47  Maroon communities formed not only 
based on African practices, but incorporated native and European customs as well.  Price 
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and others work of the 1970s demonstrated throughout the Americas, maroons created 
communities that were based on African principles, yet unique to the American 
environment. 
During this same period, Barbara Kopytoff added insight into the formation of the 
Jamaican maroon communities.  Her work directly addressed the development of the 
communities and attempted to explain better the choices made by the maroons regarding 
improvement, warfare, and religion.  In 1976, she published, The Early Political 
Development of Jamaican Maroon Societies in which she outlined the differences 
between the Windward and Leeward maroons during the seventeenth century.  Kopytoff 
found that the remoteness of the Blue Mountains allowed the Windward maroons to 
remain further isolated from attempts to subdue them.  This created small independent 
groups that cooperated, but never achieved the unity held by the Leeward maroons.48   
Kopytoff also was the first historian to outline clearly the meaning of the treaties 
to the maroons.  She argued the agreements were sacred charters to the maroons, 
consummated through West African rituals and practices.  Kopytoff also argued in 
Religious Change Among Jamaican Maroons that nineteenth century missionaries 
failed to convert maroons mainly because of their strong ties to African traditions.49  The 
continuances of African customs in the Americas led many maroons to reject missionary 
attempts, while some slaves openly accepted conversion.  Throughout these studies, 
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Kopytoff defined the maroons as a community and not bands of runaway slaves.  She 
argued this reflected in the changes made throughout their history.50   
Mavis Campbells The Maroons of Jamaica 1655-1795 offered the most complete 
picture of the eighteenth century maroons.  Her use of untouched public records in both 
Jamaica and London demonstrated both defiant, yet subservient communities.  Unlike 
Patterson and Kopytoff, Campbells purpose is not to define the causes of maroonage.  
She is more concerned with the sociological characteristics, the demographic and ethnic 
patterns, and certain ecological factors that led to successful maroon communities in 
Jamaica.  Campbells work reiterated Pattersons view that after treaties the maroons did 
a disservice to slaves in the plantations.  She indicated that while a pan-African 
movement created cohesion among the maroons, it never resonated to slaves in the 
plantations.  Maroon history, according to Campbell, must include their defiance as well 
as their atavistic stubbornness in dealing with other African-Americans in Jamaica.51   
Campbells work often assumed there was a pan-African fervor among blacks in 
eighteenth century Jamaica.  She argued that continued collaboration with the white 
authorities was a betrayal to the slaves in the plantations.  These notions, developed first 
by Patterson and reiterated throughout the late twentieth century, labeled the maroons as 
both freedom fighters and hypocrites.  Historian Hilary Beckles, however, pointed out 
that what appear to be stages in the development of a black anti-slavery polity are for 
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Campbell ideological positions.52  Campbell perhaps underestimated the rapid 
transformation of the maroon communities in eighteenth century Jamaica as well as their 
distance both physically and culturally from slaves in the plantations. 
Despite groundbreaking work by scholars, gaps in the field still exist.  As Mavis 
Campbell pointed out, there has been no complete study of the Trelawny maroons 
deportation and eventual settlement in Sierra Leone since Dallass work was published in 
1804.  Richard Price, also explained, The internal organization of maroon societies has 
received relatively little scholarly attention.53  Most likely these gaps are due to lack of 
available resources.  While this burden of source material hampers all enthnohistorians, 
further studies using the existing sources need exploration.  Few scholars have attempted 
explanations for maroon allegiance to the British and their seemingly erratic decision to 
end these agreements.  No study has attempted to explore gender roles within the 
communities.  The historiography is also in need of a complete depiction of the maroon 
communities in the nineteenth century.  This study will attempt to incorporate further the 
frontier inhabited by Jamaican maroons.  No study regarding the Jamaican maroons has 
focused entirely on the frontiers.  This work, however, will struggle to balance the lack of 
primary source material from the communities, which will continue to render any study 
of the maroons inadequate and somewhat incomplete. 
 
 
 
                                                
52 Hilary Beckles, review of The Maroons of Jamaica: A History of Resistance, Collaboration and 
Betrayal, by Mavis Campbell, American Historical Review 76 (1979): 579. 
 
53 Price, ed., Maroon Societies, 424-25. 
CHAPTER 2.  ESTABLISHING AUTONOMY IN THE FRONTIER ZONES 
 
Freedom achieved by Jamaican runaways in the seventeenth century was due 
mostly to rugged interior portions of the island.  In the Caribbean, areas of refuge for 
slaves were often near secluded mountain ranges, dense jungles, or isolated islands.  
Jamaica, unlike Brazil or portions of southern Florida, was too small to allow large-scale 
runaway communities.  Jamaican maroons formed groups in various portions of the 
interior that were uninhabited.  Only in these secluded locations, could bands of runaway 
slaves congregate and form their own independent communities.  After the colonization 
of the frontier zones, maintaining autonomy became extremely difficult for maroons. 
Frontier areas of eighteenth century Jamaica held similar characteristics to other 
areas in the Americas.  There were several reasons for maroon autonomy in the early 
period.  First, both maroon groups formed in isolated areas with harsh environments and 
few white settlers.  Second, through knowledge of the terrain, maroons utilized and 
protected the only paths into these areas making travel extremely difficult.  Third, during 
this early period, frontier zones were laden with carnage.  Often violence became horrific 
as groups vied for power.  Isolation, the difficulty of travel and rampant violence kept 
most from entering the frontier zones of the early eighteenth century. 
Seclusion and violence of the frontier zones in eighteenth century Jamaica, 
allowed the maroons to live outside the control of colonial authorities.  A military 
prowess ensured the maroons from intrusion into their communities.  The lives of the 
early maroons, however, were dangerous and difficult.  During the mid-1730s, British 
encroachments became more successful, as more troops were brought to the island.  
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While maroons remained independent, constant warfare led the groups to pursue peace 
with the British beginning in 1739.  After this event, the treaties exposed the frontier to 
new elements, but the areas remained desolate. 
Both the Leeward and Windward maroons chose isolated areas for their 
permanent settlements.  Maroons, although they resided in remote areas, remained only a 
few hours travel away from white colonists.  They formed two separate groups, one in the 
central and western portions of the island, and another in the Blue Mountains of eastern 
Jamaica.  The surrounding environment of these areas provided necessary protections that 
allowed the maroons to live independently.  From their retreats, maroons attacked 
plantations, protected all paths leading to their communities, and successfully fought off 
colonial militias sent to subdue them.   
The Windward maroon community in eastern Jamaica date back to the time of 
Spanish occupation in the seventeenth century.  Early runaways in Jamaica gathered in 
the Blue Mountains, located near the parishes of St. Thomas in the east and Portland.  
Few, if any, white settlers or planters entered the region until the mid-eighteenth century.  
It was not until 1740, after the treaty with the Windward maroons, that the first 
plantations were established in the parish of Portland.  Bryan Edwards noted in his 1793 
publication, History of the British West Indies that the Blue Mountains have never have 
been explored. 54  Oral history from twentieth century maroons in the Blue Mountains 
confirmed this idea.  Maroons indicated the early groups thought themselves to be the 
first people to settle their areas.55  
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The limited use of space by the Spanish and the destruction of the native 
population left portions of the interior regions uninhabited and available to runaway 
slaves from the coastal regions.  Although the Spanish occupation of Jamaica lasted over 
150 years, conquistadors settled in few places.  Escaped slaves formed gangs in the 
mountainous regions, far from the coastal areas inhabited by the Spanish.  The areas 
remained unoccupied throughout Spanish control.  Arawak Indians destroyed by disease 
and enslavement perished by the time of English takeover in 1655.56  Bryan Edwards 
noted, Not a single descendent of either sex inhabited the island by the time of British 
control.57  This supports Mavis Campbells assertion that very little, if any, Native 
American influence existed among the Jamaican maroons.58 
During the middle of the seventeenth century, Spanish planters sought labor from 
imported Africans after the Arawaks became extinct.  Following several rebellions and 
individuals acts of flight, runaways became formidable in the Blue Mountains by the late 
seventeenth century.  In 1658, just three years after the British won control of the island, 
runaways in the east numbered around 250.  This was a sharp increase in number.  The 
maroons grew from small gangs who roamed the mountains during Spanish occupation 
into larger, organized communities.59   
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Figure 1.  Maroon settlements and surrounding frontier zones. 
 
 
 The Leeward maroons also chose an area that was uninhabited.  They migrated 
from portions of St. Ann and Clarendon to the cockpit country, a series of caves carved 
out of limestone deposits near central portions of the interior.  The caves stretched from 
east to west with entrances that consisted of a fifty to an eighty-foot climb to enter the 
thin openings among the giant limestone.  Jamaican planter R.C. Dallas described where 
the Leeward maroons precisely located and planned their settlements to aid them in 
defense.  He described Trelawny Town, the main outpost of the Leeward maroons, when 
he asked his readers to let your imagination help me to convey you up to the immense 
mountains, successively towering one above the other, presenting tangled forests or 
immense precipices of barren rock.60  
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One British major general described the cockpit region as perhaps the strongest 
and most impenetrable of any on the face of the earth.61  Dallas described the cockpits 
entrance as a great scission made through a rock by some extraordinary force or 
convulsion of nature and through which men can pass only in a single file.62  He also 
observed, Cudjoe displayed great judgment in choosing this position, as in case of alarm 
he could throw himself into the cockpit, where no valor or force could drive him.63  In 
most cases, thick brush and bodies of water hid this gateway.  Slaves who visited the 
areas told masters and officers that this area was impracticable to any but a maroon.64  
The cockpit areas remained inaccessible to outsiders for decades.  In 1739, 
Governor Edward Trelawny explained, All throughout the length of the island from one 
end to the other the middle for some miles is full of thick woods, craggy mountains, and 
stony precipices, in these the rebels have their settlements which are almost inaccessible 
and so posted that a few can keep out fifty times their number.  They have a fastness 
behind fastness, ambushes and narrow difficult passes one behind the other, and when 
with great danger and loss of men you beat them out of one they retire to another and so 
on.65 
Both maroon groups controlled the only know roads and paths to their 
settlements.  Control of the paths by the maroons made travel in the early frontier zones 
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extremely difficult for outsiders.  Those attempting travel found the paths, steep, rocky, 
and difficult, and not wide enough to admit the passage of two persons abreast.66  
Straying from the paths left those searching for the maroons to wander aimlessly through 
dense vegetation and other perils of the sub-tropical rainforest.  From the commanding 
portion of a mountain or treetop, maroons saw any approaching parties.  Records 
indicated most attempts to ascend or traverse a path proved difficult.  Cudjoe and his men 
used rocks and boulders to stop advancing parties.  These large stones were rolled down 
the narrow paths, and often through this method, the maroons thwarted encroachments 
without firing a single shot.67   
Maroons relied upon superior knowledge of the terrain as well.  In both locales, 
maroons were thoroughly acquainted with their ground and could vanish almost 
unseen before their enemies reloaded.68  Governor Edward Trelawney remarked, By 
knowing the country and being nimbler they are often able to surround our (British) 
parties and attack them on every side hemmed in within these streights.69  Edward Long 
agreed the maroons held a clear advantage in the wilderness.  He explained, They 
(maroons) are remarkable, like North American Indians, for tracking in the woods.70  
The maroons could detect outsiders by the turn of a dried leaf, the position of a small 
twig, and other insignificant marks, which a European would overlook.71   
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Maroons hidden in the brush along paths communicated through an abeng, or the 
horn of a cow used as an instrument.  The horn, also utilized in West Africa, could 
produce various notes and scales to convey the seriousness of the call to arms.  Maroons 
in hiding reported the number of approaching enemies, the weapons they held and the 
seriousness of the threat posed all with this bugle-like instrument.  Dallas noted that the 
abeng directed by its various modulations, their movements.72  The horns also created 
chaos in battle as the constant noise led to confusion and irritation for outsiders.  
Innovative techniques such as this made control of paths into the desolate frontier zones 
even more difficult. 
 Tactics used in the early part of the eighteenth century by the British demonstrate 
the difficulty of travel in the frontier zones for non-maroons.  Even after they repulsed 
attacks, British troops refused to pursue the maroons.  Bryan Edwards described an 
unsuccessful ambush of militia members.  In 1734, Whilst the officers were at 
dinnerthe Maroons rushed suddenly from the adjacent woods and attacked them.  
Several pieces were discharged, the report of which alarmed the militia, who immediately 
ran to their arms, and came up in time to rescue their officers from destruction.  The 
Maroons were repulsed, and forced to take shelter in the woods, but the militia did not 
think fit to pursue them.73 
During the 1720s and early 1730s, the British attempted to establish a series of 
forts in the dense interior.  Some hoped the forts would provide effective supply to militia 
groups in the frontier zones.  Attempts at establishing the forts were, however, were 
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largely unsuccessful.  Often, maroons were able to gain control of British made forts.  
Once the forts were lost, the militia and soldiers were left to wander for days in wild, 
unknown terrain.  Governor Edward Trelawny noted that the parties of British sent out 
failed and only aided the maroons.  He explained the forts, have generally been so 
unsuccessful that it is supposed that much the greatest part of the arms which the rebels 
now have, have been taken from those that have gone against them.74   
With the few roads often guarded by maroons, forts also attempted to lessen travel 
in unknown terrain.  Throughout the early period of maroon development, travel, in both 
the eastern and western interiors, remained extremely dangerous.  Bryan Edwards wrote, 
Their (Maroons) barbarities and outrages intimidated whites from venturing any 
considerable distance from the sea coast.75  He noted that the Windward Maroons 
rendered every attempt to settle near them impracticableand caused several 
plantations to be thrown up and abandoned and prevented many valuable tracts of land 
from being cultivated.76  Edward Long noted, in History of the West Indies, Whole 
parishes, such as St. James and St. George were virtually desolate no mans lands.  In 
these areas traveling was not safe anywhere.77  In 1733, the Jamaican Assembly 
proclaimed the maroons had grown very formidable in the Northeast, Northwest, and 
Southwestern districts of the island, to the great terror of his majestys subjects in those 
parts.78 
                                                
74 C.O. 137/56, Trelawny to Newcastle 5 Mar 1739, In Philip Wright War and Peace, 13-15. 
 
75 Edwards, Proceedings, ix-x. 
 
76 Edwards, Proceedings, x. 
 
77 Long, History of Jamaica, 163-64. 
 
78 C.O. 137/79, In Campbell, Maroons, 68. 
 37
Maroons, thoroughly acquainted with the frontiers, led their unconventional war 
against those who entered or ventured near their communities.  Frontier zones of early 
eighteenth century Jamaica were known as violent places that few, besides the maroons 
ventured.  One British soldier explained the outcome of the battles were generally in 
favor of the maroons, they being more accustomed to traverse the mountainous woods, 
and better acquainted with the fastness and retreats they afforded.79  Edward Long 
noted, Their mode of fighting in real war, is a system of strategy, bush-fighting and 
ambush.80  Dallas reiterated notions of their irregular methods of war.  He wrote, 
Surprise and ambush were the chief principles of their (Maroons) warfare; they had not 
confidence in themselves in open fields, and therefore seldom risked a regular battle.81   
British militia members attested to the protection provided to the maroons in the 
frontiers and the often violent encounters with the groups.  In secluded spots, maroons 
waited, undetected, along paths for an opportune time to strike.  Their knowledge of the 
terrain allowed them to ambush approaching parties.  Soldiers explained to Dallas that the 
maroons hid, covered by the underwood, and behind rocks and roots of trees, waiting in 
silent for their pursuers.82  John Stewart, soldier and colonist, noted the Leeward 
maroons, hardly ever were seen, nor could the troops know where to direct their fire.83 
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The Windward maroons remained well protected as, every approach to their mountains 
was, for a mile or two, well guarded by small advanced parties.84   
R.C. Dallas described maroon warfare as, an art of attack and defense, which, in 
the difficult and hardly accessible brush of the interior of the island, has since so often 
spoiled the best exertions of bravery.85  John Stewart reflected on maroon warfare in his 
journal.  Sources acknowledged this type of warfare was only present in the frontier 
zones and maroons rarely engaged the enemy in open areas.  Stewart felt maroons would 
never conceive of European concepts of war.  He wrote, To preach this doctrine to the 
vindictive and cowardly savage is like persuasion to the deaf winds of heaven.86  
The colonists connected the maroons with the wilderness they inhabited and their 
method of guerrilla warfare.  Coastal residents saw this area as a lawlessness jungle 
where violence threatened all inhabitants.  Horrific descriptions of violence perpetrated in 
these areas led many on the island to label the maroons as ferocious and kept most from 
entering or colonizing the frontier zones.  The perceived viciousness of the maroons 
resonated in contemporary works.  Dallas wrote their appearance differed little from 
slaves and freed persons of color, but their eyes were quick, wild and fiery, the white of 
them appearing a little reddened.87  Bryan Edwards reflected, The maroons are 
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generally tall, well madethis owing in great measure to the wild and wandering life 
they lead, and to their not mixing so much with general society as other Negroes.88 
The anarchy present in the frontier areas indicated that violent encounters took 
place there.  Contemporary British soldiers and militia members who entered maroon 
territory felt that capture of an outsider by the maroons meant certain death, and likely 
torture.  Maroons also remained aware of harsh punishments reserved for runaways.  
Defeat for maroons would likely lead to a life of enslavement or execution.  The fears 
and angers of both reflected in some of the violent encounters between the two groups.   
Loyal servants reporting to their masters in the plantations told of some instances 
of graphic violence.  In their travel of the frontier areas, some slaves claimed to have 
witnessed violent acts in the capture of prisoners.  One slave, who witnessed the 
detention of several white men, expressed to his master that the maroons mutated many 
of these unhappy victims in a dreadful manner, and inflicted upon them a variety of 
studied and insulting tortures.89  Another slave claimed to have seen three white men, 
that were taken in by the maroons and carried to Negro Town and there put to death.90  
Such tales of horrific violence were commonplace in the frontier zones.  Edward 
Long wrote of a British militia member caught by the maroons.  He exclaimed his 
savage pursuers, having collected the body, in order to preserve the head as the trophy of 
victory, roasted and actually devoured the heart and entrails of the wretched victim.91  
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British colonists noted that the savagery in the frontier zones connected largely to the 
desperate situation of the maroons fighting for survival.  One soldier stated, It would be 
painful to dwell on the various shocking barbarities exercised on the unfortunate white 
men who fell, in these encounters, alive in the hands of this savage foe, who glorified in 
having such an opportunity of glutting their blood-thirsty and vindictive spirit, by 
nameless insults and protracted tortures.92 
Cultural exchange expressed through violence remained a prominent feature of 
the Jamaican frontier zones.  Anthropologist Mary Louise Pratt demonstrated initially, 
dialogue between groups vying for control of these areas resonated through violence or 
constant conflict.93  Historian Richard White argues that the continued exchange of 
various groups interacting in frontiers of the Great Lakes region leads to what he terms 
negotiated middle ground.94  This middle ground was a neutral area that no group could 
fully control, yet there remained frequent interaction, conflict, and contact.  Brazilian 
historian Hal Langfur explained how in frontier zones, groups vying for power often 
attempted to instill fear in others through horrific violence.  This involved an intensive 
search by all members to gain knowledge regarding the cultural values of the perceived 
enemies.  This type of exchange, argues Langfur, was the essential form of 
communication in Brazilian frontier zones.95 
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Scholarship understands the horrific acts participated in by both sides as 
calculated responses to establish terror and power.  Ethnohistorian Neil Whitehead 
asserted that horrific violence in contact areas was more than merely a biological 
response or a function of crude members of society.  In some cases, these acts 
demonstrated expressive purposes in the violence.  They were in fact calculated 
decisions, which made clear statements about who controlled territory in the interior.  
Whitehead found in portions of Guyana, ritualistic and violent death became a mark of 
Amerindian autonomy. 96   
Jamaican maroons also adopted violence as a form of self-expression.  During this 
early period violence kept outsiders a considerable distance from the communities.  
Katherine Verdery notes that corpses often carried great weight in the frontier zones and 
colonial societies.  Disfigurement was as a method of controlling religious perceptions 
and beliefs.97  Jamaican historian Vincent Brown also found that ritual executions gave 
the actors supernatural powers.  The mutilations of dead bodies in contact zones were 
symbolic acts that empowered both groups.  Most importantly, however, it contributed to 
the fear many had about entering these unknown areas, and ultimately to little 
development of the frontier parishes near the maroon settlements.98 
Violence for the Jamaican maroons extended beyond their areas into frontier 
plantations.  Many times slaves, women, and children were targeted for kidnap or 
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murder.  This fear caused many colonists to abort early attempts at colonizing areas near 
the maroons.  R.C. Dallas stated the maroons, In their predatory excursions greatly 
distressed the back settlers, by plundering their houses, destroying their cattle, and 
carrying off their slaves by force.99  One planter wrote, By night, they seized the 
favorable opportunity that darkness gave them, of stealing into the settlements, where 
they set fire to cane fields and outhouses, killed all the cattle they could find, and carried 
slaves into captivity.  He added, This was a dastardly method of conducting war.100   
The early maroons of Cudjoes group at times targeted civilians and plantations.  
Stewart noted orders were often issued from their retreats, burning and plundering, and 
massacring wherever they went, the defenseless white inhabitants.101  Edwards 
expressed similar concern about the Windward group.  He stated, No settlement could 
be established near them; for they butchered every white family that ventured to seat 
itself any considerable distance inland.102  R.C. Dallas acknowledged, Murder attended 
all their successes; not only men, but women and children were sacrificed to their fury, 
and even people of their own color, if un-connected with them.103 
Oral histories from the maroon communities often acknowledge this violence was 
a response to similar acts perpetrated against runaways and slaves.104  Planters used 
ritualistic killings to deter slaves from running away.  For instance, in 1738, two slaves 
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charged with killing a white man were taken to the location where the white man was 
slain and subsequently put to death there.  One planter in the frontier parish of 
Westmoreland stated two of the rebel Negroes were tried and burnt with a slow fire 
(alive) in the same location of the white mans death.105  This was a clearly calculated 
decision and an attempt at deterrence.  It also was a form of expression and an attempt to 
manage areas thought to be outside the control of the colonial governance.  
British violence against maroons during this period was less documented, but 
certainly present.  Stewart explained, Instances occurred of their (British soldiers) 
opening the graves, and cutting off the heads from the putrid carcasses of the maroons 
who had been there interred. 106  John Stewart acknowledged his concern for this level of 
violence, It must indeed be confessed, that the whites sometimes did things which could 
answer to no other end than to exasperate the maroons.107  These acts were clearly an 
attempt to win control of the maroon territories.  Much like planters, those hunting the 
maroons attempted to utilize ritualistic violence to assert control of the frontier.  
Some of these horrific descriptions ascribed to the maroons and the British were 
baseless.  Contemporary R.C. Dallas admitted, Many of the horrors attributed to them 
(maroons) are void of foundation.108  Long attested he did not witness these incidents, 
but had heard the testimony from men of character.109  Likely, the men were fellow 
planters and militia members determined to dissuade any slaves that might attempt to join 
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the maroons.  Vicious stories created by slaves in the plantations also contributed to 
creating a perception of the frontier zones as a dangerous place of ritualistic murders, 
cannibals, and barbarians.   
Despite the challenge of frontier warfare, by 1735 the militias had won a series of 
victories that damaged the maroons.  This began in 1729 as Governor Robert Hunter put 
forth a sustained effort to pacify the maroons and control areas around their settlements.  
Although the maroons remained defiant, historian Mavis Campbell pointed out these 
years were a time of profound crisis.  From 1731-1735, nine expeditions were sent after 
the maroon groups.  It was at this time that, colonists resolved to make every sacrifice, 
to put an end to this harassing war. 110  One expedition consisted of upwards of 400 men 
and was successful in the destruction of Nanny Town (main outpost of the Windward 
maroons) in 1734.111  After this victory by the militias, maroons retreated further into 
isolation, rarely engaging in battles from 1735-1739.  At this point, maroons seemed to 
realize they could not defy the colonial system much longer.  British regulars in Jamaica 
numbered around 800 by 1738, nearly double what maroons faced just a decade earlier.  
Frontier zones were under pressure, and eventually the protections these areas afforded 
began to diminish.   
Cudjoe later explained that the tolls of constant warfare that once created their 
communities were now eroding them.  One contemporary noted, Both parties had now 
grown heartily wearied out with this tedious conflict.  The white inhabitants wished relief 
from the horrors of continual alarms, the hardship of military duty, and the intolerable 
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burden of maintaining an army.  The maroons were not less anxious for an 
accommodation; they were hemmed in, and closely beset on all sides; their provisions 
destroyed, and themselves reduced to a miserable condition, by famine and insufficient 
attacks.112 
Although violence had been at the heart of their community, it was clear to 
Cudjoe and other maroons that constant warfare would likely result in the death, 
deportation, or enslavement.  Dallas asserted, If relief from the fatigues of an uncertain 
war was agreeable to the white inhabitants of the island, it was no less to the maroons 
who for some time before been kept in a state of continual alarm.113  According to 
Dallas, Cudjoe acknowledged he had for some time been in a state of want and 
despondency.114  Dallas explained, That if peace had not been offered to them, they had 
no choice left but either to be starved, lay violent hands on themselves, or surrender to the 
English.115 
For decades though, the seclusion and violence of the early frontier zones helped 
the early maroons remain autonomous.  Historian Barbara Kopytoff notes the importance 
of this initial independence.  She argues, For the maroons, the entire span of their history 
before 1739 is especially important because it was the only time when they were able to 
develop political institutions outside the sphere of influence of the colonial society.116  
During this period, they were largely outside the control of the colonial governance living 
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in frontier zones that offered ample protection from outsiders.  Harsh and isolated 
environments, maroon knowledge of the terrain and paths and persistent violence allowed 
the maroons to develop autonomously.  These protections would diminish throughout the 
1730s, and eventually by the end of the century, they disappeared.  As the frontier zones 
became smaller, maroon groups pursued collaboration with the colonial authorities for 
their long-term survival in the frontier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3.  EXPOSING THE FRONTIER ZONES 
 
Most scholars have suggested the treaties signed between the maroons and 
colonial authorities to be entirely in favor of those authorities.117  There clearly were 
reasons to read them this way.  A number of clauses restricted maroon freedoms such as 
methods of punishment, ministering of justice, and control over foreign affairs.  
Immediately after 1739 until the 1770s, however, the treaties remained beneficial to the 
maroons.  They ended warfare, granted them allotted space, brought the maroons into the 
colonial economy, and most importantly signified their right to exist.  Maroons during the 
post-treaty period fully recognized these benefits and primary source material indicated 
they willingly complied with the set terms of the agreement. 
Initial benefits for the maroons of this period, however, exposed the frontier zones 
in a number of ways.  Treaty provisions placed an added British presence in the maroon 
communities and the surrounding frontiers.  The treaties also required the maroons to 
police the frontier zones to keep runaway slaves from gathering and becoming a threat.  
Both resulted in the areas becoming safer and easier for production and colonization.  
The statistics of the later quarter of the century demonstrated this reflected growth.  
Despite the maroons control, a number of revolts, runaways, and renegade maroons 
threatened the frontier zones throughout the post-treaty period.  This demonstrated while 
the areas were easier to access, neither the colonial government nor the maroons 
controlled all areas of the interior.  There remained frontier zones in the cockpit region 
and Blue Mountains that offered protection and defense for some rebel groups.   
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Both treaties contained clauses that ended the secrecy of maroon locations.  
Clauses 13 and 14 of the Leeward treaty and clauses 3 and 5 of the Windward treaty 
required clear paths to maroon towns and for British officers to live among the 
communities.  British superintendents, as the officers were known, maintained friendly 
relations with the maroons.  Communities once secret to outsiders, were now closely 
watched and monitored.   
 Other stipulations made the frontier zones safer for travel.  The first clause of both 
treaties ended hostility between the groups.118  Both the maroons and the British, weary 
of battle, agreed and abided by this regulation.  Other stipulations required the maroons to 
hunt and suppress runaways that inhabited the remaining barren regions of the interior.  
Clause 6, 9, and 10 of the Leeward treaty and clauses 8 and 9 of the Windward treaty 
stipulated the maroons patrol the surrounding frontier zones in search of runaways.119  
The clauses further stated that the maroons aid the plantocracy in the suppression of slave 
rebellions.  For a steady source of income, the maroons willingly accepted their role as 
enforcers.  Essentially, the maroons solved the colonists problem of having a large 
refuge for runaway slaves.  Since the British occupation, runaways remained one of the 
most difficult obstacles to safer travel and colonization within the interior.   
With a lack of ample frontier space, slaves had difficulty retreating and 
plundering of neighboring frontier plantations.  The treaties stated, That the said Captain 
Cudjoe, and his successors, do use their best endeavors to take, kill, suppress or destroy, 
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either by themselves or jointly, with any other number of men commanded on that 
service by his Excellency the Governor or Commander in Chief for the Time being, all 
Rebels wheresoever they be throughout this Island.120  According to contemporary 
accounts, maroons hunted down individual runaways and suppressed any attempts at 
large-scale rebellions or alliances between renegade maroons and slaves.   
The policing made areas of the frontier zones much safer for outsiders.  Maroon 
groups eradicated safe havens for runaway slaves, and pursued with vengeance slaves in 
the frontier zones.  Dallas explained that runaways captured by the maroons would 
immediately be sent back to the Chief Magistrate of the next parish where they are 
taken; and those that bring them are to be satisfied for their trouble as the legislature shall 
appoint.121  One planter explained that after the treaties, maroons proved themselves a 
useful body to the colonial government.  Governor Edward Trelawny agreed.  He 
remarked the post-treaty maroons hold a perfect harmony with the country and render 
themselves as useful as possible by taking up our runaways and returning them of their 
own accord.122   
 While flight remained a problem on the plantations, it reached nowhere near the 
levels of previous generations or other colonies with the maroons patrolling the 
interior.123  There was an increase in the number of slave rebellions, but perhaps this 
could be attributed to the distraught slaves having fewer choices.  Individual flight was 
now much more difficult and dangerous.  For centuries, the wilderness provided hiding 
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places for many runaways.  Unable to control and patrol the areas, the British employed 
the maroons.  With superior hunting skills, maroons easily tracked most slaves that fled 
into the desolate areas that remained.  Often this capture was violent, vengeful, or deadly 
for the runaway slaves.   
A lack of space in which slaves could retreat rendered flight difficult, if not 
impossible in some locations.  This area was frequently traveled by whites and heavily 
patrolled by the maroons.  Dallas explained the merits of the alliance, 
but who can say what other communities of slaves might have been 
formed in the woods and mountains, and what other wars might have been 
the consequence?  It is very probable that assemblages of fugitives would 
have been formed in the woody and almost inaccessible retreats of the 
country, had it not been for the frequent scowering of the woods by the 
maroons, in search of run-away Negroes.  These assemblages would in 
time have formed new maroon bodies, as difficult to be subdued as the 
former; and so far more dangerous than the original Maroons were in their 
outfit, that their connection with the slaves would have been more 
general.124 
 
Techniques utilized in hunting wild hogs, aided the maroons in their pursuit of 
runaways.  The maroons who patrolled the wilderness were excellent hunters and 
trackers.  One contemporary noted, they placed a considerable dependency on 
hunting.125  The process of hunting wild game was a daily aspect of life for maroon 
males.  John Stewart exclaimed, The constant exercise of their limbs in ascending and 
descending, and their custom of exploring the vast mountains and precipices of the 
interior country in pursuit of wild boar, contributed to their strength and symmetry.126  
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Contemporary literature indicated the maroons pursued runaways with the same 
skill they had shown in decades of battles with the British regulars.  These activities 
demonstrated areas of interior Jamaica remained that no group completely controlled.  
Guerrilla war tactics and a superior knowledge of the frontier zones continued to benefit 
the post-treaty maroons.  Violent encounters between newly imported Africans and 
maroons lasted throughout the post-treaty period.  Primary sources noted the severity 
with which the maroons treated the captured runaway slaves.  Edwards stated, In their 
treatment of fugitive slaves, they manifest a blood-thirstiness of disposition, which is 
otherwise unaccountable.  He added, Although their vigilance is stimulated by the 
prospect of reward, they can have no possible motives of revenge or malice towards the 
unfortunate objects of their pursuit.127 
  These actions were likely calculated responses with a clear message to the slaves 
to remain out of maroon controlled territory.  Such violence reflected competition over 
space that went beyond assurance of reward money.  According to one colonist, many 
times the maroons, with nothing more than a pretense would put the poor wretches to 
death.128  Another contemporary noted, the fugitive slaves were frequently maimed 
without provocation, oftentimes bringing home the head of the fugitive, instead of a 
living man; making their plea of resistance an excuse for their barbarity.129 
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At first, planters encouraged this type of violence.  They too had utilized terror 
tactics for deterrence.  Dallas noted that soon after the treaties the maroons made few 
efforts at capturing runaways alive.  He stated the maroons were, careless whether they 
brought in a runaway alive, or only his head.130  After about a decade though, execution 
became counterproductive to the profitability of plantations.  With the price of labor 
importation climbing, the colonial government acted to ensure better the return of healthy 
runways.  In 1751 and 1753, laws passed by the Colonial Assembly safeguarded that 
runaways returned alive by granting the maroons more rewarded money.  Dallas 
explained the first law of 1751 that applied to the Leeward community.  He wrote, A 
law was passed, with great policy, allowing, besides the usual reward, mile-money for 
every runaway produced alive. 131  Maroons, in part, depended upon the income earned 
from catching slaves.  The importance of this income reflected in their willingness to halt 
executions, ritual violence, and ruthlessness toward runaways after they were granted a 
higher bounty for the return for healthy runaways.  The decrease in violent acts was also 
another reflection of a slowly depleting frontier. 
Besides their pursuit of individual flight, maroons also helped to stop large-scale 
rebellions from forming in the interior.  One colonist told Edwards that, Besides their 
utility in preventing assemblages of fugitives, they had been active in the suppression of 
rebellions.132  In the mid to late eighteenth century, numerous slave rebellions occurred 
in Jamaica.  Revolts shook the whites confidence and challenged their ability to maintain 
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the established power structure, which now included the maroons.  Without areas of 
retreat, rebels however, often were put down quickly with the aid of maroons. 
The first uprising suppressed with the help of maroons involved some of their 
own renegade members.  In 1742, some of Cudjoe's headmen, dissatisfied with the treaty 
aligned themselves with slaves from a nearby estate in an attempted rebellion.  The group 
expressed anger over the recent treaties.  Slaves and maroons, both of Akan (West 
African) origin, attempted to lead an uprising that planned to destroy both loyal maroons 
and the neighboring plantations.  The ambitious plan was for the rebellious maroons to 
cut off all those there that were born in the woods, or came from other countries.133  
Rebellious slaves on the plantation would gain control of the plantations and meet their 
allies in the interior.   
This plan failed to materialize as Cudjoe immediately armed a sufficient number 
of the most faithful of their (his) people, attacked the rebels, killed some, took others and 
chased the rest home to their plantations. 134  Cudjoe later brought the conspiracies 
leaders to the colonial officials where he recommended execution for their actions.  The 
rebels who joined their cause were easily defeated in battle, subdued, and sent into 
slavery.  The defeat persuaded many maroons to adhere to their colonels demands to 
abide by the treaties.  After this event, instances of large, organized dissent diminished 
among the maroons until 1795. 
The Windward maroons also demonstrated their lack of support for other groups 
of runaways forming in the remaining frontier areas.  A group known only as the Congo 
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Settlement, lived autonomously and outside the control of both the maroons and the 
colonists for some supposed twenty years.  Descendants of the Windward maroons 
discovered the settlement in a small area south of the Blue Mountains as they policed the 
interior.  The Congo group was quickly defeated by the maroons and was dispersed with 
some of the Negroes returning to the estates to which they formerly belonged, and others 
surrendering with the maroons.135  
In 1760, maroons aided the suppression of a large uprising in which slaves 
retreated to the outskirts of the plantations near the frontier zones.  The revolt, which 
started in the parish of St. Mary, moved west to St. Anne, and included slaves from the 
parishes of St. James and Trelawny.  Led by a slave called Tacky, the rebels claimed the 
early maroons provided inspiration for their rebellion.  The slaves claimed, like the pre-
treaty maroons, they too fought to obtain their freedom.  Some planters suggested this 
connection might have contributed to the maroons slow reaction to the crisis.  Edwards 
noted at first some maroon groups refused to participate in the fighting against Tackys 
men.  Dallas explained though maroons insisted they regularly be paid their head money 
allowed by law for every runaway and rebel they had taken up previously before they 
joined in the battle.136  After granting this request, the maroons fully participated in the 
suppression.  
Contemporaries described the aid the maroons gave to the colonial authorities 
during Tackys rebellion.  After both the Leeward and the Windward groups reached the 
rebels, they suppressed the rebellion within six months of fighting.  One contemporary 
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described the final battle as the maroons at first, lined the wood to the right and left, to 
prevent ambush (of the British).  Later they penetrated the wood at the foot of the hill, 
and ascending it on the opposite side, and spreading themselves, suddenly assaulted the 
rebels (Tacky's men) in flank, who were instantly routed, and a great number killed, or 
taken prisoner.137 
Other contemporaries noted of the maroons aid in this suppression.  Dallas stated 
the maroons stood forth with a determined spirit against the insurgents; and in the 
conflicts of the year of 1760, lost several of their people.138  Westmoreland planter 
Thomas Thistlewood exclaimed, Cudjoe's men behaved with great bravery during 
Tackys revolt.139  Maroons again aided the planters when smaller uprisings took place in 
1761, 1765 and 1766.  The involvement of the maroons in these rebellions was less 
documented.  Historian Michael Craton pointed out that the 1760 rebellion was not 
equaled in scale until the revolts of 1831 and 1865.  With the aid of the maroons, most 
rebellions ended in a matter of days and weeks.  In 1768, for their services in these 
supportive roles, the former descendants of the Leeward maroons received a reward of 
four hundred and fifty pounds.  The bonus granted to the Accompong and Trelawny 
maroons was not only a debt of gratitude, but also to encourage their future service.140 
It is too difficult to determine the extent of maroon involvement in some slave 
uprisings as contemporaries expressed varied accounts of their activity.  For the most part 
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though, the maroons accepted their role as enforcers.  This reflected in the little success 
of eighteenth century slave revolts in Jamaica and the 1768 bonus payment from the 
British.  Despite some discrepancy, post-treaty maroons were willing participants against 
any organized attempts at overthrowing the colonial governance or the established terms 
of the treaties. 
 Besides the safety provided from the maroon patrols, the frontier zones became 
more secure due to the presence of British officers.  All maroon settlements were 
required to have at least two resident British officers.141  The officers, known as 
superintendents, maintained their presence by preserving the peace in their (Maroon) 
settlements, preventing the concourse of slaves in the towns, and sending parties out on 
duty (in search of runaways). 142  Officials also kept a close watch of the maroon 
population, tracking the number of able-bodied males and new births.143  Throughout the 
post-treaty period, maroons accepted the officers, despite their obvious role as spies.  
 British resident officers also oversaw the regulation and maintenance of paths and 
roads.  According to the treaty, the Leeward maroons were required, to cut, clear and 
keep open, large, and convenient Roads from Trelawny Town to Westmoreland and St. 
Jamess, and if possible to St. Elizabeths. 144  Dallas also stated that every three months 
the resident officers completed detailed reports on the state of the roads into maroon 
settlements.  The reports were than brought before the Colonial Assembly who monitored 
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the transportation of people, goods, and services in these areas.  Clear paths led to easier 
travel to and from the coastal areas and ended the secrecy of maroon locations. 
  Officers developed further control of the areas through their cordial alliance with 
maroon leaders.  Colonels ruthlessly controlled nearly every aspect of maroon life, even 
in the post-treaty period.  R.C. Dallas noted after the treaties, The successors or Cudjoe 
maintained a degree of influence and authority.145  Another contemporary observed, 
All their disputes were subject to the determination of their chiefs, to whom they looked 
upon with implicit confidence, and whom they usually obeyed without argument.  He 
added, They were governed in a very despotic manner.146   
Colonels embraced their new allies, and the British officers repaid their loyalties.  
In the years following the treaties, colonels received numerous gifts.  The gifts included 
inscribed silver chains, gold lockets, weapons, and leather boots.  Long felt the gifts were 
necessary to continue to win the allegiance of the maroons.  He noted, officers often 
bestowed to maroons, some mark of favor, such as a waistcoat, a hat, a sword, fusee, or 
any other articles of like nature which seem acceptable.147  According to Long, the 
maroons were pleased with these distinctions, and a trifling douceur of this sort 
bestowed annually, accompanied with expressions of favor, wins their hearts and 
strengthens their dutiful attachments.148 
Along with gifts, maroons adopted English fashion.  Contemporary discussions of 
encounters mentioned the change of dress among the maroons.  This alteration indicated 
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the maroons willingness to collaborate with the colonists.  Early maroons wore little 
clothing and no shoes or boots.  Pictures of Cudjoe, prior to this period, portrayed a short 
stocky man with modest clothing.  After the treaties, maroon dress became much more 
extravagant.  One maroon colonel from Accompong wore a ruffled short, blue broad 
cloth coat, scarlet cuffs to his sleeve, gold buttonswhite cap and hat, white linen and 
breeches puffed at the knee. 149  Many maroons also wore feathered caps.  In the post-
treaty period, one planter who met a colonel felt he had somewhat of a majestic look in 
English attire.150 
Besides fashion, the post-treaty maroons also adopted English names.  Early maroon 
colonels used West African names such as Cudjoe, Nanny, Quao, and Accompong.  By 
1760, however, many maroons took English names such as Johnny, James, and Reid.  
Dallas stated in a footnote that it became the maroon custom of adopting the names of 
the gentlemen of the island.151  Edwards agreed that it was, universally practiced 
among the Maroons (in addition to freed blacks) of attaching themselves to different 
family names among the English, and desiring gentlemen of consideration to allow the 
Maroon children to bear their names.  Montague James, John Palmer, Tharp, Jarrett, 
Parkinson, Shirley, White, and many others, are names adopted this way.152 
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Figure 2.  Old Cudjoe Making Peace.  In R.C. Dallas, History of the Maroons, v. 
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By all indications, maroon leaders maintained their agreements with the British, 
and this reflected through their willingness to adopt some British customs.  This 
strengthened alliance reinforced a British presence in the frontier zones.  Areas that were 
once impossible to locate for the militias of the 1720s were, by 1750, under a greater 
British influence.  Through their presence, British officers helped to gradually erode the 
protections afforded to the early maroons in the rough interior. 
Through the maroons compliance and an added British presence, frontier zones 
gradual shrunk from 1739 until the end of the century.  The depletion of the frontier 
zones reflected the complaints made by maroons near the end of the eighteenth century.  
Colonial expansion did not resonate immediately among the post-treaty maroons, but 
after decades of expansion.  While the Jamaican economy thrived after 1750, it was not 
until the 1770s that large-scale production took place in the frontier parishes of 
Westmoreland, St. James, St. Mary, and Portland.153   
Treaties exposed the frontier zones through the patrolling by the maroons and an 
added British presence.  These actions compromised the frontier and made once violent 
locations much safer.  During this post-treaty period, however, frontier zones were not 
fully closed.  For a few decades, maroons subsisted in the frontier by patrolling runaways 
and maintaining cordial relations with the colonial government.  This collaboration, 
however, drastically changed the maroons' quasi-allegiance with most of the slave 
communities, and perhaps diminished any chance of a large-scale rebellion.  Without safe 
havens to retreat to, there was little chance for successful resistance against the colonial 
authorities.  Despite this absence of warfare, as long as areas of unoccupied land 
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remained available for the maroons to patrol, they could exist in the colony as distinctive, 
semi-autonomous communities.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4.  THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TRELAWNY FRONTIER 
 
 
Frontier zones slowly diminished throughout the later half of the eighteenth 
century.  Autonomy for the maroons connected largely to desolate areas where they could 
either wage guerrilla campaigns against the colonial authorities or work as enforcers 
patrolling the areas for an allotted sum.  To eighteenth century colonists and planters, it 
was unclear how the maroons would fit into the colony outside of these roles.  By the end 
of the eighteenth century, two factors had greatly compromised the existence of one 
particular frontier zone in western Jamaica close to the Trelawny maroons.  This 
subsequently challenged maroons survival in that area as well.  One factor was increased 
colonization after these areas were made safer by the treaties.  Expansion constricted the 
maroons, and groups throughout the island complained of a lack space.  Many found 
stipulations of the treaties too difficult to abide by while living alongside more 
plantations.  Another factor that led to destruction of the Trelawny frontier was the slave 
rebellion in neighboring St. Dominuge.  This uprising, which lasted from 1789 until 
1804, sent Jamaica into a panicked state.  Fearful colonial officials attempted to control 
every aspect of the colony, including the remaining frontiers.   
Ongoing colonization proved difficult for all maroons, but expansion particularly 
threatened the areas around Trelawny in western Jamaica.  In 1795, the Trelawny 
maroons, burdened with additional colonization and a colonial government bent on 
further control, eventually rebelled.  Complaints of the Trelawny maroons centered 
largely on the two issues of increased colonization and the threat of rebellion.  An 
incident involving the punishment of two maroons for theft as well as their unhappiness 
with a newly appointed superintendent were seen as direct challenges to their autonomy.  
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Contemporaries and historians both agreed these events led to the eventual uprising.  
Governor Alexander Balcarres thought it was probable that this insurrection is owing to 
private disputes.154  Maroon historian Carey Robinson asserted the main grievance of 
the maroons was that the whipping was done by a runaway slave who had earlier been 
captured by maroons from Trelawny.155   Most scholars who have studied the 1795 war, 
determined the causes were mainly local disputes between the Trelawny maroons and 
neighboring planters regarding methods of punishment, land rights and hunting grounds.  
The occurrences, however, were themselves connected to the destruction of the 
frontier zones surrounding the Trelawny maroons.  Placing the Trelawny maroons in a 
frontier context allows historians to understand the complexities involved in this uprising.  
While distraught over immediate occurrences, Trelawny maroons were the first of many 
Jamaican maroon communities to have their very existence challenged through the 
destruction of their surrounding frontier areas. 
The Trelawny maroons provided the substance of their disagreements to the 
magistrates of St. James parish in 1794.  The disputes of the Trelawny maroons submitted 
were: 
1. An infringement of their treaty by the magistrates of Montego Bay, in causing  
the punishment of whipping to be inflicted on some of their people by the 
hand of a slave. 
 
2. That the land originally granted to them for their subsistence was worn out, 
and, being not sufficient for their support, they required an additional quantity, 
saying that the penns of several settlers in the neighborhood would suit them. 
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3. That Captain Craskell, their superintendent, was, on account of his      
timidity, unqualified for his office; and as they had experienced the 
disposition and abilities of Major James, they were desirous of his re-
appointment, and averse to receiving any other.156 
 
 The complaints demonstrated the frontier areas were compromised through 
colonization and reactions to the war in St. Domingue.  The first two complaints were 
derived from increased colonization of the areas around Trelawny.  A lack of space for 
movement, production, and growth angered the Trelawny group.  Often the pursuit of 
goods brought them into closer contact with the colonists.  The third complaint tied into 
the colonial authorities concern over exiles from the St. Dominuge entering the maroon 
communities.  To keep closer watch of the Trelawny maroons, officers who were less 
friendly took positions held by long time allies of the maroons.  These incidents were the 
climax of ongoing problems steaming from the reduction of frontier space.  Frontier 
zones were essential for the maroons to maintain autonomy.  Without appropriate space 
for production, autonomy and growth, maroon existence remained uncertain and 
ambiguous.   
John Stewart claimed a maroon named Johnson spoke with him regarding the 
maroons situation on the eve of the Trelawny War.  Johnson reiterated the same 
concerns given to the magistrates.  The maroon stated (according to Stewart): 
No be afraid, we wont hurt you, we wont burn your house down; 
but we give key, we want what you have in your house to eat and drink.  
When we gone, no stay here; go to Buckra, and tell them, say, Johnson no 
been want for trouble them; him been want for keep for himself to 
himself; but Buckra come and burn him house; them rock out him ground; 
them say, they want for kill me; my wife and pickininnie no have house; 
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no have victual.  Well!  So long as Buckra trouble me first, I will shew 
him something too.157  
 
Stewart later described Johnson as grateful and considerate, although he 
breathed revenge and threatened destruction.158  The anecdote reiterated the same 
troubles the magistrates described, and alluded to many worries that faced the 
communities by the 1790s.  The angry maroon referenced the rocky ground and 
restrictions that allowed to British to burn any Maroon settlement, field, or land outside 
their allotted areas.  He also expressed concern about a dwindling food supply because of 
this perceived loss of farming land.  It cannot be certain whether these were words taken 
directly from a maroon or merely fabricated by Stewart.  The quote, however, expressed 
the same wants and needs of the Trelawney maroons that they had stated to the 
magistrates.  It provides no contrary evidence and only further supports the ills of the 
Trelawny group. 
Tension between the maroons and British colonists climaxed after the punishment 
of several maroons for stealing hogs from a white farmer.  Edwards noted, Two 
Trelawny town maroons were convicted by the magistrates of Montego Bay of stealing a 
hog from a white settler of St. Jamess, and were sentenced for this crime to be whipped 
publicly by the work-house driver.159  The maroons caught in the incident were of little 
consequence to the Trelawny community.  They later told colonists that, if the whites 
had put their companions to death, they would not have complained, but to disgrace and 
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degrade them was an injurious insult to the whole tribe.160  After the incident the 
maroons wished for permission to hang both of them, having long considered them as 
runaways and thieves.161  
 The main concern of the Trelawny maroons was the method of the punishment, 
which publicly demonstrated their subservient status by having a slave whip members of 
their community.  The incident directly challenged the maroons ability to maintain 
autonomous communities outside the realm of punishment intended for freed blacks in 
the urban areas and slaves in the plantations.  This complaint to the magistrates also 
reflected the lack of space for the Trelawny maroons.  Clearly, the maroons saw this as an 
infringement of their sovereignty.  The incident, however, demonstrated the distance 
between the rest of the colony and the maroons became much smaller.  The fight for 
resources, like wild hogs, reflected this closing gap. 
The loss of land was a problem for maroons throughout interior Jamaica.  Sugar 
expansion, however, in the frontier province of Westmoreland greatly threatened the 
towns of Trelawny and Accompong.  The Trelawney group threatened from nearly all 
directions seemed the most desperate of the five maroon settlements on the island.  As 
one soldier exclaimed in 1790, The Trelawny town maroons were by far the most fierce, 
daring, and warlike of these people.162 
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Figure 3.  Sugar  and coffee exports of Jamaica, 1700-1900.   
 
 
Much of this anger resonated around increase sugar production that fueled 
territorial expansion.  Throughout the eighteenth century, sugar production soared in 
Jamaica.  Plantations expanded throughout the island to meet demand abroad.  Sugar 
production made up ninety-percent of British investment in the Caribbean during the mid 
to late eighteenth century, and some scholars have suggested this figure was even higher 
in Jamaica.163  Soil exhaustion on smaller islands such as Barbados shifted production 
around the turn of the seventeenth century to larger operations in Jamaica, Brazil, and 
Cuba.  Jamaica produced such an abundance of sugar from 1750-1800, historian Eric 
Williams declared this era the Silver Age of Sugar.164   
The added sugar production burdened the maroons in a number of ways.  British 
planters sought uninhabited frontiers where the maroons once roamed freely.  In 1750, 
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around 1,600,000 acres of land in Jamaica still lied idle.165  Colonists were eager to 
expand on what they thought to be fertile land.  In the parish of Westmoreland, sugar 
plantations expanded rapidly, threatening the Leeward descendants in Trelawny and 
Accompong.  In 1754, Governor Charles Knowles described the uninhabited region of 
Westmoreland as tolerable even ground and what hills are in it are pretty easy of access 
and the soil is fertile.  Patrick Browne, in his 1756 publication, A Natural History of 
Jamaica, exclaimed these hills were most agreeable for sugar cane.166  Development in 
Westmoreland reflected this desired growth.  In 1738, this area included about 443 whites 
with 7,137 slaves producing 5, 450 hogsheads of sugar a year.  By 1768, whites 
numbered well over 1,000, with over 15,000 slaves producing about 13,000 hogsheads of 
sugar per year.  A province once barren in the 1730s, produced twelve percent of 
Jamaicas sugar by the late eighteenth century.167 
During this time of immense growth, the maroons living space became 
constricted.  Maroon groups grew somewhat after the treaties, but had fewer resources to 
provide for an expanding population.168  Maroons found living at least three miles from 
any white settlement increasingly difficult.  Besides their allotted 1,500 acres, maroons 
utilized lands around their communities for hunting and farming.  Contemporaries 
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expressed that land was important as besides their provisions, the maroons had a stock 
of cattle and they kept mares, from which they bred horses for sale.  These fed in the 
woods and on neighboring heaths. 169  The horses also proved useful for travel in the 
desolate areas.  Without available areas outside of their allotted space, maroons found 
self-sufficiency much more difficult.    
The treaties initially attempted to make certain areas more manageable for the 
British to control.  After several decades, restrictions were still difficult to enforce.  In 
1761, the Jamaican Assembly passed a law that further restricted maroon space to their 
allotted 1500 acres.  The law read, If any maroon absented himself from his town 
without leave of the commanding officer, or, if he obtained leave, continued to absent 
himself for seven days after the expiration of such leave, then upon complaint made to 
any magistrate of the parish where the truant was found, (where) he was sent to jail.170 
Confinement such as this led to a lack of proper farming ground or ample grazing land, 
but secured once barren areas for colonial production.  This forced the maroons to 
interact with the colonists for goods that were once readily available in the frontier zones 
surrounding maroon communities.  The disruption of grazing land and hunting rights in 
the frontiers were the root causes of many disputes between the maroons and British 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
By the 1770s, maroons expressed their anger over the growth into the interior and 
the added restriction to their movement.  The grievances of all maroons mirrored the 
second complaint of the Trelawny group to the magistrates.  George Gray, an officer who 
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lived with the Charles Town maroons, noted the dwindling amount of space.  He 
demonstrated that in 1756 when he arrived there were no whites near their settlement.  By 
1776, several sugar works and other plantations have been settled in the neighborhood 
of their town, and upon the lands where their stock formerly used to range; by which 
means, they cannot raise stock of any kind, without encroaching on the neighboring 
plantations, as the land allotted for them is steep and hilly.171  Planters grabbed available 
fertile land and maroons farmed exhausted or rocky soil.  Land that once contained sugar 
plantations was also difficult to revive.  Sugar plantations required living quarters for 
slaves, a boiling house and distillery as well as acres of land for production.  Soil erosion 
often occurred within a matter of decades for some plantations.  Richard Pares in his 
1929 discussion of the West Indies noted the difficultly and cost associated with 
converting a factory into a field.172   
As the century progressed, maroon agriculture, therefore, became much more 
limited and constrained.  The restrictions on acreage and colonial expansion confined the 
maroons to land that was largely un-productive, either overworked from former farms 
and plantations or too steep and rocky.  Maroons that inhabited areas near the parish of 
St. James complained a great part of that (maroon land) which was run out for them, is 
rocks and cockpits. 173  Another contemporary observed, The soil of their mountains 
was unfavorable, being either moist or clayey.174  They felt forced to move closer to 
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white settlements to sustain themselves and their growing population.  Trelawny Town 
petitioned for a new survey of the land surrounding their designated area in 1770.  
Contemporary sources indicated that in Trelawny of the 1500 acres of which their 
territory consisted, a third was merely rock, about a hundred acres worth cultivating, and 
the rest of it was over-run with a species of fern and Foxtail grass, which are certain 
indications of poor soil. 175  This allowed a population of around 470 only about 100 
acres of usable land.176   
Besides these troubles, Trelawny maroons also expressed concern over a change 
in their superintendent.  The final complaint of the Trelawny maroons stemmed from the 
appointed British officer in their town.  Colonial officials excused the maroons long time 
leader Major John James, who had served for nearly thirty years.  The Trelawny group 
had grown accustomed to his presence and valued his opinion.  He also kept a 
considerable distance from himself and the maroons, and only intervened at the 
instruction of the colonel.  By 1790, the colonel of the Trelawny maroons had adopted his 
surname to become Colonel Montague James.  Over Major James tenure, he came to hold 
a substantial amount of power due to his aid and insight.   
In 1791, planters complained to the Colonial Assembly that Major James had 
spent too much time at his residence some five miles away from Trelawny Town.  
Colonial officials found James in dereliction of duty and replaced him with Captain 
Thomas Craskell, a surveyor bent on keeping a close watch on the communities.  
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Colonial officials hoped he would keep a closer watch on the community, as they become 
more convinced that a wide spread rebellion would take place.  The maroons were upset 
at Craskells timid nature and his unwillingness to engage in their affairs as James had 
done.  Ironically, they too were upset at Craskells constant presence.  A key demand to 
the magistrates was the re-instillation of James and the removal of Craskell.177 
Unbeknownst to the Trelawny maroons, attempts at reassignment were poorly 
timed, as the colonial government was in a panicked state.  Despite the fact that the 
maroons lived peacefully for some fifty years, colonists were convinced that they wanted 
only war.  Those living in urban or developed areas of the colony remained somewhat 
unaware of the dramatic changes that had taken place in the maroon communities during 
the last forty years of the eighteenth century.  They associated the Trelawney group with 
the warlike entities of the 1730s largely because they still inhabited the wild frontiers.  
The rebellion of St. Domingue further confined and restricted all non-white inhabitants of 
colonial Jamaica.  Colonial officials exacerbated the situation between the colonists and 
the maroons mainly due to their own fear of a large-scale revolt.  The plantocracy felt 
that if a rebellion among the maroon groups occurred, Jamaica would have exhibited a 
scene of general conflagration, havoc and ruin.178 The combined grievances of the 
maroons as well as the fears of colonial officials eventually led to sustained armed 
conflict between colonial officials and maroons for the first time since the treaties nearly 
fifty-five years ago.   
The fears grew mainly from a large slave rebellion that overtook the French 
colony of St. Domingue beginning in the late 1780s.  In 1793, Governor Adam 
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Williamson left to lead an expeditionary force to St. Domingue and Governor Alexander 
Balcarres ascended to command of the island.  Balcarres felt that preemptive action 
would save Jamaica from revolt and chaos.  Planters, colonial officials, and colonists in 
Jamaica feared a similar rebellion among the slaves.  The situation in St. Domingue 
influenced Jamaican officials in dealing with their plantations and the neighboring 
maroon communities as well.   
Tales of violence in St. Domingue horrified colonists in Jamaica.  By 1789, a 
slave rebellion in French province of St. Domingue spread across most of the colony.  At 
the time of the uprising, the colony contained an estimated 465,000 slaves.  In the 
Northern Province of Le Cap Francois over 100,000 slaves united with free blacks and 
destroyed nearly 300 plantations.  An eyewitness observed that the slaves massacred a 
great number of whites, and have taken as prisoners some females of that complexion, 
whom they forced to do the duties of a servant.179   
Bryan Edwards described his own apocalyptic version of what he felt could 
happen in Jamaica if a maroon-slave alliance occurred.  If successful, they would have 
had it in their power to destroy the property of the country; and many slaves, seeing their 
successes and their desperate exploits would have been tempted, by a view of 
independence, to have joined their banners and to have massacred the few whites who 
had been left in care of the plantations.180  Edwards warned his fellow Jamaican planters 
of the disaster nearby and urged preemptive action to maintain security on the island.  He 
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explained, Nothing can afford solid and permanent security to Jamaica, but tranquility at 
home.181   
Many were convinced that immigrants and bandits would ruin Jamaica by 
instilling ideals of liberty and justice among their own slaves.  Edwards wrote of the 
dangers his island could face, The island of Jamaica must have a vigilant eye to its own 
safety.  Its trade, both outwards and homewards, will be exposed to capture; and such 
devastation may be spread over the windward parishes by hordes of banditti, coming 
either in open canoes from the southern parts of St. Domingo, and may destroy the labor 
of years, before the squadron at Port Royal can give the smallest assistance to the 
inhabitants.182 
By the spring of 1795, only two years after Balcarres appointment, British 
officials felt that war was inevitable with the Trelawny maroons.183  The situation in St. 
Domginue had worsened and there was growing concern about emigrants arriving in 
Jamaica from the war torn areas.  In a letter to Governor Alexander Balcarres, the 
magistrates of St. James Parish expressed their concern over a possible rebellion stirred 
by French exiles.  Colonists and planters accused the maroons of working with French 
emigrants to stir up rebellion in the frontier zones and on the plantations.  Many of the 
officers in Jamaica had fought previously in the American Revolution and remained 
angry over French interference in that conflict.  Officials linked the maroons and their 
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foreign enemies together as forces who sought to oust them from their powerful 
positions. 184  
Governor Alexander Balcarres was certain of French involvement in Jamaica 
during his tenure.  He insisted there was an attempt by French emigrants to burn 
Kingston in the beginning of April.185  He noted, Several attempts have also been made 
to bribe my secretary and immense sums have been offered for his interest.186  Balcarres 
pointed to French involvement in many different unexplained instances.  By the end of 
May 1795, his statements echoed the widespread paranoia in Jamaica.  He stated, I shall 
allow no foreigner whatsoever to remain on this island, unless I know what he is, and 
where he is; and I positively will not suffer any man capable of bearing arms to remain 
here.187  He later reiterated his concern, but assured the people of Jamaica in his 
leadership.  He wrote, although attempts have been made with much assiduity to 
introduce French principles into this island, I think they have made no impression at all, 
and it shall be my anxious care to suffer no inlet whatsoever for their doctrine.188   
Colonial officials readily connected the Trelawny Maroons to other problems said 
to have derived from the French.  This led to increased control and observation of 
Trelawny town.  In 1791, Governor Williamson reiterated the tone Balcarres later 
adopted.  Williamson stated shortly before his departure to St. Domingue, I am 
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convinced that the ideas of liberty have sunk so deep in the minds of all Negroes, that 
whenever the greatest precautions are not taken they will rise.189  
A portion of a speech given by Balcarres on August 2, 1795 summarized his 
reasons for the belief the French had plotted with the maroons.  He explained, I am of 
the opinion that the minds of the Trelawny Town maroons have been corrupted by 
incendiaries from the enemy.  That the enemy have felt the pulse of this country is 
notorious.  The attempt to burn Kingston-the intemperate expressions of Frenchmen, 
whom I had taken up as spies-the circumstance of some Frenchmen of the worst 
characters hovering at large about the country-these and many other indications have also 
given the alarm to my mind.190 
No direct evidence linked the Trelawny maroons with activities of French 
insurgents or spies.  The claim, however, reflected the chaotic period of late eighteenth 
century Jamaica.  Organized communities of freed blacks had aided slaves during the 
uprising in neighboring St. Domingue.  Jamaican authorities remained convinced of a 
maroon-slave alliance, if a large-scale slave rebellion occurred.  This anxiety produced 
policies, which compromised the Trelawny frontier and pushed an already exasperated 
group to war. 
  From their complaints to the magistrates, records of colonial planters in frontier 
provinces and Johnsons statement, it is clear that by the time of Governor Williamsons 
departure in 1793, the Trelawny maroons had grown uneasy over more than just 
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restrictions to their space or perceived violations of their sovereignty.  They felt the 
alteration of their superintendent, the loss of land and the punishment of their fugitives 
clearly violated the treaties that had offered protection and ensured survival.  The 
panicked government only added to this pressure.  A combination of local events shaped 
by occurrences in the greater Atlantic World eventually led to the destruction of the 
frontier areas that surrounded the Trelawny maroons and that destruction left the 
community vulnerable and desperate enough to rebel. 
From their pleas to John Wentworth in Nova Scotia, it appears the Trelawny 
maroons held no plans of widespread rebellion, but sought only self-preservation.191  The 
reasons for the 1795 rebellion connected to immediate occurrences, but also reflected in 
the gradual changes that took place beginning in 1739.  The stealing of hogs, the re-
assignment of Craskell, and the complaints of rocky ground demonstrated the maroons 
were upset over the changes that had taken place since the frontiers were exposed.  As 
Dallas suggested in 1804 The causes of the Maroon insurrection are too fought in events 
and objects remote and more serious than the occurrence which immediately preceded 
their taking up arms.192   
By the 1790s, the Trelawny maroons no longer had aid from neighboring 
communities, once secure paths had been cleared, and colonels had become strong 
supporters of their British allies.  Damaged relations with the slave population also 
diminished any ability to remain autonomous.  Slaves aligned with colonial authorities 
after the maroons ruthless pursuit of runaways and suppression of rebellions.  The 
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frontier zones, which once served as a refugee for slaves and maroons, were no longer 
outside the control of the colonial authorities.  A larger maroon population was forced to 
adapt to fewer resources, which led to a change in diet, trade, and lifestyle.   
These events, combined with reactions to the situation in St. Domingue, best 
explained the rebellion of 1795.  Clearly, events outside of Trelawny and western 
Jamaica factored into the rebellion.  Despite all the disadvantages the maroons 
confronted, they still managed to keep the British soldiers busy for several months.  One 
observer noted, A small body of Negroes defied the choicest troops of one of the 
greatest nations in the world, kept an extensive country in alarm, and were at length 
brought to surrender, only by a means of a subvention still more extraordinary than their 
own mode of warfare.193   
The limited success demonstrated small retreats were still beyond any groups 
control.  The war of 1795, which lasted a little over nine months, initially began in May, 
when the maroons launched several successful attacks.  This success incited colonial 
fears as officials pleaded for additional resources.  By the middle of August 1795, 1,000 
additional soldiers were sent to Jamaica from St. Domingue.194  Despite this presence, the 
maroons continued to be an annoyance for British soldiers.  Trelawny maroons, however, 
had few resources.  They were surrounded and outnumbered, pursued by dogs, and 
hunted by vengeful soldiers who sought revenge for executed compatriots.  By January 
1796, most of the Trelawny maroons surrendered, but it was not until March that all 
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maroons were subdued.  By the end of May, the Trelawny maroons left on two ships for 
Nova Scotia.195 
The war of 1795 was a defining moment in the history of all maroons living in 
Jamaica, but it was also significant because it marked the end of one frontier zone.  After 
the Trelawney group was deported, other maroons continued their complainants over the 
expansion into the frontier.  Disputes over land, hunting rights and later the introduction 
of Christian missionaries continued into the nineteenth century.  By the mid-nineteenth 
century, maroons who remained in Jamaica were confined to many of the same 
restrictions as slaves on the plantations.  In 1842, an Assembly act voided the treaties 
signed with the maroons.  This point truly marked the end of autonomy for all maroons, 
and would seem to signify the end of all frontier zones in Jamaica.  This destruction, 
however, was uncertain, as there remained large tracts of uninhabited land throughout the 
nineteenth century.  Frontiers remained difficult to approximate both physically and 
chronologically as they were by nature ambiguous and undefined. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
 Few scholars emphasized the frontier zones when treating the Jamaican maroons, 
despite growing literature that demonstrated the importance of this space.  The history of 
the Jamaican maroons exemplified the correlation of maroonage and frontier 
environments.  Scholars, who have acknowledged the importance of the Jamaican 
frontiers, perhaps have overestimated their value initially and underestimated the regions 
role in the post-treaty period.  The frontiers were not impenetrable, but merely difficult to 
negotiate, as it took years of fighting for the British to gain concessions with the 
maroons.  By the end of the eighteenth century, however, frontier zones were in rapid 
decline, and this greatly threatened the maroons ability to survive autonomously. 
From the time of their origin, maroon groups found protection and independence 
in the frontier zones.  They utilized the secluded locations and harsh environments to 
remain autonomous.  Early maroons demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the frontier 
terrain.  This familiarity allowed them to stop aggression into their areas by controlling 
the only known paths into their settlements.  Early maroons also benefited from the 
constant violence of the frontier zones.  Violence kept most out of these areas and 
allowed the maroons to develop independently.  
For decades, maroons utilized the cockpit regions or Blue Mountains to thwart 
any aggression into their communities.  In areas un-inhabited by colonists, runaways and 
those born free lived without the constraints that dominated the coastal cities and towns.  
Legendary figures such as Cudjoe, Nanny and Quao reinforced their political and military 
power through religious practices such as the obeah and sorcery, observations forbidden 
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in the plantations.  Maroons built their own unique communities that combined elements 
of African culture but adapted them to fit their new world environment and experiences.   
The forty years in the wilderness allowed the maroons to development permanent, 
autonomous settlements with cultural distinctions apart from slaves in the plantations or 
free blacks in urban areas.  Maroon historian Mavis Campbell explained, The maroons, 
over time, had developed an inordinate sense of their own importance and a marked 
feeling of superiority over the other blacks of the island.196  Contemporaries described 
the maroons as distinct entities, unlike other enslaved West Africans in the plantations.  
This clear distinction perhaps was the reason maroons suppressed slave rebellions and 
captured runaways.  The maroons calculated their relations with slaves according to their 
value.  Early communities depended upon the slaves for goods, information, and 
companionship.  After the treaties, many maroons viewed slaves as nothing more than 
economic opportunities, not as fellow Africans united in a struggle against the colonial 
system.197   
Post-treaty communities remained dependent upon the frontier for distinction, but 
in other ways.  The nature of the frontier changed drastically after the treaties along with 
maroon allegiance.  The treaties made frontier zones much safer and more susceptible to 
colonization.  Treaties forced the maroons to patrol remaining frontier zones in search of 
runaways and brought an added British presence into the areas.  British influence 
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resonated in the language and naming practices of the post-treaty maroons.  Most 
maroons accepted some of these changes because they felt there were adequate 
protections in the treaties signed with the British colonists.  As frontier zones grew 
smaller, however, maroons became even more dependant on the treaties for their survival 
and less dependant on the environment.  
 Like the frontier zones, the treaties ensured maroon survival.  The documents 
were sacred to the communities and this was reflected in the lack of maroon cooperation 
by the time of the Trelawny War.  This spilt indicated that frontier zones were either 
closing or rapidly changing.  Maroons no longer sought protections in the frontier zones 
by the turn of the century, but looked for aid in the treaties.  Historian Barbara Kopytoff 
believed the source of conflict between the Trelawny maroons and the neighboring 
Accompong maroons developed over the possession of the original treaty signed with the 
Leeward maroons.  Dallas also suggested that the groups were related to each other, but 
had quarreled for the custody of the original treaty of 1739. 198  The battle over the 
treaties reflected a loss of ample space.  This fight should be seen as a last attempt by the 
maroons to maintain autonomy. 
Not only treaties, but also large events in the Atlantic World challenged frontier 
zones and maroons.  Increased colonization, sugar production, war in Europe and war in 
neighboring St. Domingue all played a role in the destruction.  Eventually, the closing of 
the frontier zones brought the Trelawny community to war.  Without frontiers to patrol, 
or validation through treaties, it was clear, the maroons had no place in the colony to live 
independently.  Large communities of free blacks posed a threat so long as slavery 
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remained.  The threat became even more menacing in times of crisis, such as the one in 
late eighteenth century with the situation in St. Domingue.  Placing the maroons in a 
frontier context demonstrates that local events were not entirely to blame for the rebellion 
of 1795.   
Frontier zones were constricted and expanded according to events that happened 
as nearby as Kingston and Port Royal, yet as far away as St. Domginue, France and 
England.  Like most occurrences in the colonial Americas, the story of the Jamaican 
maroons in the eighteenth century was linked to developments in the Atlantic World that 
surrounded them.  The maroons emerged out of colonization and war between the 
Spanish and British.  As the colony expanded, maroons altered their allegiances to remain 
independent.  In that decision, they helped to further colonization.  After the British-
maroon alliance, the island saw an increase in sugar production as Jamaica became one of 
Englands wealthiest colonies.  Areas that were once considered dangerous expanded 
rapidly with production.  Eventually this growth confined the maroons to areas that were 
uninhabitable.  The panic state of Jamaica in the 1790s, due to rebellions in the United 
States, France and St. Domingue, also largely contributed to the destruction of the 
frontier zones the Trelawny maroons needed for survival.  Viewing these changes as 
related, albeit distantly, to the story of the maroons better explains their roles as both 
collaborators and rebels.  The history of the maroons, like all residents of eighteenth 
century Jamaica, was derived from the momentous events happening around them.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A.  
Treaty signed between British colonists and Leeward maroons, 1739. 
In the Name of God , Amen.  Whereas Captain Cudjoe, Captain Accompong, Captain 
Johnny, Captain Cuffee, Captain Quaw, and several other Negroes their Dependants and 
Adherents, have been in a State of War and Hostility for several Years past against our 
Sovereign Lord the King, and the Inhabitants of this Island: And whereas Peace and 
Friendship amongst Mankind, and the preventing of Effusion of Blood, is agreeable to 
God, constant to Reason, and desired by every good Man; and whereas his Majesty 
George the Second, King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, and of Jamaica Lord, 
Defender of Faith, etc. has by Letters Patent, dated February the Twenty-Fourth, One-
thousand seven hundred and thirty eight, in the Twelfth Year of His Reign, granted full 
Power and Authority to John Gutherie and Francis Sadler, Esquires, to negotiate and 
finally conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the aforesaid Captain Cudjoe, the 
rest of his Captains, Adherents, and others his men, they, mutually, sincerely, and 
amicably have agree to the following Articles, 
 
1st, That All Hostilities Shall Cease on both Sides for ever. 
 
2dly, That the said Captain Cudjoe, the rest of his Captains, Adherents and Men, shall be 
for ever hereafter in a perfect State of Freedom and Liberty, expecting those who have 
been taken by them, or fled to them within the two Years last past, if such are willing to 
return to their said Masters and Owners, with full Pardon and Indemnity, from their said 
Masters and Owners for what is past. Provided always, That if they are not willing to 
return, they shall remain in Subjection to Captain Cudjoe, and his Friendship with us, 
according to the Form and Tenor of this Treaty. 
 
3dly, That they shall enjoy and possess for themselves and Posterity for ever, all the 
Lands situate and lying between Trelawny Town and the Cockpits, to the Amount of 
Fifteen hundred Acres, bearing North-west from the said Trelawny Town. 
 
4thly, That they shall have Liberty to plant the said Lands with Coffee, Cocoa, Ginger, 
Tobacco, and Cotton, and to breed Cattle, Hogs, Goats, or any other Stock, and dispose 
of the Produce or Increase of the said Commodities to the Inhabitants of this Island.  
Provided always, That they bring the Said Commodities to Market, they shall apply first 
to the Custos, or any other Magistrate of the respective Parishes where they expose their 
Goods for Sale, for License to vend the same. 
 
5htly, That Captain Cudjoe, and all the Captains Adherents, and people not in Subjection 
to him, shall all live together within the Bounds of Trelawny Town; and that they have 
Liberty to hunt where they shall think fit, except within three Miles of any Settlement, 
Crawl or Pen.  Provided always, That in case of Hunters of Captain Cudjoe, and those of 
other Settlements meet, then the Hogs to be equally divided between both Parties. 
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6thly, That the said Captain Cudjoe, and his Successors, do use their best Endeavors to 
take, kill, suppress or destroy, either by themselves or jointly, with any other Number of 
Men commanded on that Service by his Excellency the Governor or Commander in Chief 
for the Time being, all Rebels wheresoever they be throughout this Island, unless they 
submit to the same Terms of Accommodation granted to Captain Cudjoe, and his 
Successors. 
 
7thly, That in case this Island be invaded by any foreign Enemy, the said Captain Cudjoe, 
and his Successors herein after named, or to be appointed, shall then, upon Notice given, 
immediately repair to any Place the Governor for the Time being shall appoint, in order 
to repel the said Invaders with his or their utmost Force; and to submit to the Orders of 
the Commander in Chief on that Occasion. 
 
8thly,That if any white Man shall do any Manner of Injury to Captain Cudjoe, his 
Successors, or any of his or their People, they shall apply to any commanding Officer or 
Magistrate in the Neighborhood for Justice; and in case of Captain Cudjoe, or any of his 
People, shall do any Injury to any white Person, he shall submit himself or deliver up 
such Offenders to Justice. 
 
9thly, That if any Negroes shall hereafter run away from their Masters or Owners, and 
fall into Captain Cudjoes Hands, they shall immediately sent back to the Chief 
Magistrate of the Next Parish where they are taken; and those that bring them are to be 
satisfied for their Trouble, as the Legislature shall appoint. 
 
10thly, That all Negroes taken since the raising of this Party by Captain Cudjoes People, 
shall immediately be returned. 
 
11thly, That Captain Cudjoe, and his Successors, shall wait on his Excellency, or 
Commander in Chief for the Time being, every Year, if thereunto required. 
 
12th, That Captain Cudjoe, during his Life, and the Captains succeeding him, shall have 
full Power to inflict any Punishments they think proper for Crimes committed by their 
Men among themselves (Death only excepted) in which Case, if the Captain thinks they 
deserve Death, he shall be obliged to bring them before any Justice of the Peace, who 
shall order Proceedings on their Trial equal to those of other free Negroes. 
 
13th, That Captain Cudjoe with his People shall cut, clear and keep open, large, and 
convenient Roads from Trelawny Town to Westmoreland and St. Jamess, and if possible 
to St. Elizabeths. 
 
14th, That Two white Men to be nominated by his Excellency, or the Commander in 
Chief for the Time being, shall constantly live and reside with Captain Cudjoe and his 
Successors, in order to maintain a friendly Correspondence with the Inhabitants of this 
Island. 
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15th, That Captain Cudjoe shall, during his Life, be Chief Commander in Trelawny 
Town, after his Decease the Command to devolve on his Brother Captain Accompong; 
and in case of his Decease, on his next Brother Captain Johnny; and, failing him, Captain 
Cuffee shall succeed, who is to be succeeded by Captain Quaco, and after all their 
Demises, the Governor or Commander in Chief for that Time being, shall appoint from 
Time to Time whom he thinks fit for that Command. 
 
In Testimony of the above Presents, we have hereunto set out Hands and Seals the Day 
and Date above written. 
 
John Gutherie (L.S.) 
Francis Sadler (L.S.) 
The Mark X of Captain Cudjoe (L.S.) 
 
Appendix B.  
 
Treaty between British colonists and the Windward maroons, 1740. 
 
Whereas his Excellency Edward Trelawny , Esquire; Governor and Chief in Command 
of the Island aforesaid, hath given Power and Authority to  Colonel Robert Bennett to 
treat with the rebellious Negroes, this day, Being The Twenty-third Day of June, One 
thousand seven hundred and thirty-nine, Captain Quao, and several other under his 
command, surrendered under the following Terms, viz. 
 
First, That all Hostilities on both sides shall cease for ever, Amen; 
 
Second, That Captain Quao and his People shall have a certain Quantity of  
Land given to them, in order to raise Provisions, Hogs, Fowls, Goats, or 
whatsoever Stock they may think proper, Sugar-Canes excepted, saving for  
their Hogs, and to have Liberty to sell the same; 
 
Third, That Four White Men shall constantly live and reside with them in their 
Town, in order to keep a good Correspondence with the Inhabitants of this  
Island; 
 
Fourth, That Captain Quao and his People shall be ready on all Commands the  
Governor or the Commander in chief for the Time being shall send him, to  
suppress and destroy all other Party and Parties of rebellious Negroes, that  
now are or shall from Time to Time gather together or settle in any Part of the  
Island, and shall bring in such other Negroes as shall from Time to Time run  
Away from their respective Owners, from the Date of these Articles; 
 
Fifth, That the said Captain Quao and his People shall also be ready to assist 
his Excellency the Governor for the Time being, in case of any Invasion, and  
shall put himself, with all his People that are able to bear Arms, under the  
Command of the General or Commander of such Forces, appointed by his  
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Excellency to defend the Island from the said Invasion; 
 
Sixth, That the said Captain Quao and his People shall be in Subjection to  
his Excellency the Governor for the Time being, and the said Captain Quao shall once 
every Year, or oftener, appear before the Governor, if thereunto required; 
 
Seventh, That in case any of the Hunters belonging to the Inhabitants of this Island, and 
the Hunters belonging to Captain Quao, should meet, in order to hinder all Disputes, 
Captain Quao will order his People to let the Inhabitants Hunters have the Hog; 
 
Eighth, That in case Captain Quao and his People shall take up any runaway  
Negroes that shall abscond from their respective Owners, he or they shall carry them to 
their respective Masters or Owners, and shall be paid for so doing, as the Legislature 
shall appoint; 
 
Ninth, That in case Captain Quao and his People should be disturbed by a greater 
Number of Rebels than he is able to fight, that then he shall be assisted by as many White 
People as the Governor for the Time being shall think proper; 
 
Tenth, That in case any of the Negroes belonging to Captain Quao shall be guilty of any 
Crime or Crimes that may deserve Death, he shall deliever him up to the next Magistrate, 
in order to be tried as other Negroes are; but small Crimes he may punish himself; 
 
Eleventh, That in case any White Man, or other Inhabitants of this Islands, shall disturb 
or annoy any of the People, Hogs, Stock or whatsoever Goods may belong to the said 
Captain Quao, or any of his People, when they come down to the Settlements to vend the 
same, upon due Complaint made to a Magistrate he or they shall have Justice done them; 
 
Twelfth, That neither Captain Quao, nor any of his People shall bring any Hogs, Fowls, 
or any other kind of Stock or Provisions to sell to the Inhabitants, without a Ticket from 
under the Hand of one or more of the White Men residing within their Town; 
 
Thirteenth, That Captain Quao nor any of his People, shall hunt within Three Miles of 
any Settlement; 
 
Fourteenth, That in case Captain Quao should dye, that then the Command of his People 
shall descend to Captain Thomboy, and at his Death to descend to Captain Apong, and at 
his Death to Captain Blackwell shall succeed, and at his Death Captain Clash shall 
succeed; and when he dies, the Governor of Commander in chief for the Time being shall 
appoint whom he thinks proper; 
 
In Witness to these Articles, the above named Colonel Robert Bennett and Captain Quao 
have set their Hands and Seals the Day and Year above written, 
 
Robert Bennett (L.S.) 
The Mark of X for Captain Quao 
